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Elonis v. United States 
13-983 
 
Ruling Below: United States of America v. Anthony Douglas Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3rd Cir. 
2013), cert granted, 134 S.Ct. 2819 (2014). 
 
After his motion to dismiss his indictment was denied, defendant was convicted in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of making threatening 
communications, based on comments he posted on social networking website. Defendant 
appealed. 
 
Questions Presented: (1) Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and Virginia v. Black, 
conviction of threatening another person under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires proof of the 
defendant's subjective intent to threaten, as required by the Ninth Circuit and the supreme courts 
of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont; or whether it is enough to show that a “reasonable 
person” would regard the statement as threatening, as held by other federal courts of appeals and 
state courts of last resort; and (2) whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, conviction of 
threatening another person under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires proof of the defendant's subjective 
intent to threaten. 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
ANTHONY DOUGLAS ELONIS, Appellant. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit 
 
Decided on September 19, 2013 
 
[Excerpt, some footnotes and citations omitted] 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
This case presents the question whether the 
true threats exception to speech protection 
under the First Amendment requires a jury 
to find the defendant subjectively intended 
his statements to be understood as threats. 
Anthony Elonis challenges his jury 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), 
arguing he did not subjectively intend his 
Facebook posts to be threatening. In United 
States v. Kosma, we held a statement is a 
true threat when a reasonable speaker would 
foresee the statement would be interpreted 
as a threat. We consider whether the 
Supreme Court decision in Virginia v. Black, 
overturns this standard by requiring a 
subjective intent to threaten. 
I. 
387 
 
In May 2010, Elonis's wife of seven years 
moved out of their home with their two 
young children. Following this separation, 
Elonis began experiencing trouble at work. 
Elonis worked at Dorney Park & Wildwater 
Kingdom amusement park as an operations 
supervisor and a communications 
technician. After his wife left, supervisors 
observed Elonis with his head down on his 
desk crying, and he was sent home on 
several occasions because he was too upset 
to work. 
One of the employees Elonis supervised, 
Amber Morrissey, made five sexual 
harassment reports against him. According 
to Morrissey, Elonis came into the office 
where she was working alone late at night, 
and began to undress in front of her. She left 
the building after he removed his shirt. 
Morrissey also reported another incident 
where Elonis made a minor female 
employee uncomfortable when he placed 
himself close to her and told her to stick out 
her tongue. On October 17, 2010 Elonis 
posted on his Facebook page a photograph 
taken for the Dorney Park Halloween Haunt. 
The photograph showed Elonis in costume 
holding a knife to Morrissey's neck. Elonis 
added the caption “I wish” under the 
photograph. Elonis's supervisor saw the 
Facebook posting and fired Elonis that same 
day. 
Two days after he was fired, Elonis began 
posting violent statements on his Facebook 
page. One post regarding Dorney Park 
stated: 
Moles. Didn't I tell ya'll I had several? 
Ya'll saying I had access to keys for the 
fucking gates, that I have sinister plans 
for all my friends and must have taken 
home a couple. Ya'll think it's too dark 
and foggy to secure your facility from a 
man as mad as me. You see, even 
without a paycheck I'm still the main 
attraction. Whoever thought the 
Halloween haunt could be so fucking 
scary? 
Elonis also began posting statements about 
his estranged wife, Tara Elonis, including 
the following: “If I only knew then what I 
know now, I would have smothered your ass 
with a pillow, dumped your body in the back 
seat, dropped you off in Toad Creek, and 
made it look like a rape and murder.” 
Several of the posts about Tara Elonis were 
in response to her sister's status updates on 
Facebook. For example, Tara Elonis's sister 
posted her status update as: “Halloween 
costume shopping with my niece and 
nephew should be interesting.” Elonis 
commented on this status update, writing, 
“Tell [their son] he should dress up as 
matricide for Halloween. I don't know what 
his costume would entail though. Maybe 
[Tara Elonis's] head on a stick?” Elonis also 
posted in October 2010: 
There's one way to love you but a 
thousand ways to kill you. I'm not going 
to rest until your body is a mess, soaked 
in blood and dying from all the little cuts. 
Hurry up and die, bitch, so I can bust this 
nut all over your corpse from atop your 
shallow grave. I used to be a nice guy but 
then you became a slut. Guess it's not 
your fault you liked your daddy raped 
you. So hurry up and die, bitch, so I can 
forgive you. 
Based on these statements a state court 
issued Tara Elonis a Protection From Abuse 
order against Elonis on November 4, 2010. 
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Following the issuance of the state court 
Protection From Abuse order, Elonis posted 
several statements on Facebook expressing 
intent to harm his wife. On November 7 he 
wrote:
 
Did you know that it's illegal for me to 
say I want to kill my wife? 
It's illegal. 
It's indirect criminal contempt. 
It's one of the only sentences that I'm not 
allowed to say. 
Now it was okay for me to say it right 
then because I was just telling you that 
it's illegal for me to say I want to kill my 
wife. 
I'm not actually saying it. 
I'm just letting you know that it's illegal 
for me to say that. 
It's kind of like a public service. 
I'm letting you know so that you don't 
accidently go out and say something like 
that 
Um, what's interesting is that it's very 
illegal to say I really, really think 
someone out there should kill my wife. 
That's illegal. 
Very, very illegal. 
But not illegal to say with a mortar 
launcher. 
Because that's its own sentence. 
It's an incomplete sentence but it may 
have nothing to do with the sentence 
before that.  
So that's perfectly fine. 
Perfectly legal. 
I also found out that it's incredibly illegal, 
extremely illegal, to go on Facebook and 
say something like the best place to fire a 
mortar launcher at her house would be 
from the cornfield behind it because of 
easy access to a getaway road and you'd 
have a clear line of sight through the sun 
room. 
Insanely illegal. 
Ridiculously, wrecklessly, insanely 
illegal. 
Yet even more illegal to show an 
illustrated diagram. 
 
 
 
Insanely illegal. 
Ridiculously, horribly felonious. 
Cause they will come to my house in the 
middle of the night and they will lock me 
up. 
Extremely against the law. 
Uh, one thing that is technically legal to 
say is that we have a group that meets 
Fridays at my parent's house and the 
password is sic simper tyrannis. 
Tara Elonis testified at trial that she took 
these statements seriously, saying, “I felt 
like I was being stalked. I felt extremely 
afraid for mine and my children's and my 
families' lives.” Ms. Elonis further testified 
that Elonis rarely listened to rap music, and 
that she had never seen Elonis write rap 
lyrics during their seven years of 
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marriage. She explained that the lyric form 
of the statements did not make her take the 
threats any less seriously. 
On November 15 Elonis posted on his 
Facebook page: 
Fold up your PFA and put it in your 
pocket Is it thick enough to stop a bullet? 
Try to enforce an Order 
That was improperly granted in the first 
place Me thinks the judge needs an 
education on true threat jurisprudence 
And prison time will add zeroes to my 
settlement 
Which you won't see a lick 
Because you suck dog dick in front of 
children 
* * * 
And if worse comes to worse 
I've got enough explosives to take care of 
the state police and the sheriff's 
department 
[link: Freedom of Speech, 
www.wikipedia.org] 
This statement was the basis both of Count 
2, threats to Elonis's wife, and Count 3, 
threats to local law enforcement. A post the 
following day on November 16 involving an 
elementary school was the basis of Count 4: 
That's it, I've had about enough 
I'm checking out and making a name 
for myself Enough elementary schools 
in a ten mile radius to initiate the most 
heinous school shooting ever 
imagined 
And hell hath no fury like a crazy man 
in a kindergarten class 
The only question is ... which one? 
By this point FBI Agent Denise Stevens was 
monitoring Elonis's public Facebook 
postings, because Dorney Park contacted the 
FBI claiming Elonis had posted threats 
against Dorney Park and its employees on 
his Facebook page. After reading these and 
other Facebook posts by Elonis, Agent 
Stevens and another FBI agent went to 
Elonis's house to interview him. When the 
agents knocked on his door, Elonis's father 
answered and told the agents Elonis was 
sleeping. The agents waited several minutes 
until Elonis came to the door wearing a t-
shirt, jeans, and no shoes. Elonis asked the 
agents if they were law enforcement and 
asked if he was free to go. After the agents 
identified themselves and told him he was 
free to go, Elonis went inside and closed the 
door. Later that day, Elonis posted the 
following on Facebook: 
You know your shit's ridiculous when 
you have the FBI knockin' at yo' door 
Little Agent Lady stood so close 
Took all the strength I had not to turn the 
bitch ghost 
Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her 
throat Leave her bleedin' from her jugular 
in the arms of her partner 
[laughter] 
So the next time you knock, you best be 
serving a warrant 
And bring yo' SWAT and an explosives 
expert while you're at it 
Cause little did y'all know, I was strapped 
wit' a bomb 
Why do you think it took me so long to 
get dressed with no shoes on? 
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I was jus' waitin' for y'all to handcuff me 
and pat me down 
Touch the detonator in my pocket and 
we're all goin' 
[BOOM!] 
These statements were the basis of Count 5 
of the indictment. After she observed this 
post on Elonis's Facebook page, Agent 
Stevens contacted the U.S. Attorney's 
Office. 
II. 
Elonis was arrested on December 8, 2010 
and charged with transmitting in interstate 
commerce communications containing a 
threat to injure the person of another in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). The grand 
jury indicted Elonis on five counts of 
making threatening communications: Count 
1 threats to patrons and employees of 
Dorney Park & Wildwater Kingdom, Count 
2 threats to his wife, Count 3 threats to 
employees of the Pennsylvania State Police 
and Berks County Sheriff's Department, 
Count 4 threats to a kindergarten class, and 
Count 5 threats to an FBI agent. 
Elonis moved to dismiss the indictments 
against him, contending the Supreme Court 
held in Virginia v. Black that a subjective 
intent to threaten was required under the true 
threat exception to the First Amendment and 
that his statements were not threats but were 
protected speech. The District Court denied 
the motion to dismiss because even if the 
subjective intent standard applied, Elonis's 
intent and the attendant circumstances 
showing whether or not the statements were 
true threats were questions of fact for the 
jury. 
Elonis testified in his own defense at trial. A 
jury convicted Elonis on Counts 2 through 5, 
and the court sentenced him to 44 months' 
imprisonment followed by three years 
supervised release. Elonis filed a post-trial 
Motion to Dismiss Indictment with 
Prejudice under Rule 12(b)(3); and for New 
Trial under Rule 33(a), to Arrest Judgment 
under Rule 34(b) and/or Dismissal under 
Rule 29(c). The District Court denied the 
motion to dismiss the indictment, finding the 
indictment correctly tracked the language of 
the statute and stated the nature of the threat, 
the date of the threat and the victim of the 
threat. The court also stated the objective 
intent standard conformed with Third 
Circuit precedent. The court found the 
evidence supported the jury's finding that 
the statements in Count 3 and Count 5 were 
true threats. Finally, the court held that the 
jury instruction presuming communications 
over the internet were transmitted through 
interstate commerce was supported by our 
precedent in United States v. MacEwan. 
III.
 
A. 
Elonis was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 
875(c) for “transmit[ting] in interstate or 
foreign commerce any communication 
containing any threat to kidnap any person 
or any threat to injure the person of 
another....” Elonis contends the trial court 
incorrectly instructed the jury on the 
standard of a true threat. The court gave the 
following jury instruction: 
A statement is a true threat when a 
defendant intentionally makes a 
statement in a context or under such 
circumstances wherein a reasonable 
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person would foresee that the statement 
would be interpreted by those to whom 
the maker communicates the statement as 
a serious expression of an intention to 
inflict bodily injury or take the life of an 
individual. 
Elonis posits that the Supreme Court 
decision in Virginia v. Black requires that a 
defendant subjectively intend to threaten, 
and overturns the reasonable speaker 
standard we articulated in United States v. 
Kosma. 
In United States v. Kosma, we held a true 
threat requires that the defendant 
intentionally make a statement, written or 
oral, in a context or under such 
circumstances wherein a reasonable person 
would foresee that the statement would be 
interpreted by those to whom the maker 
communicates the statement as a serious 
expression of an intention to inflict bodily 
harm upon or to take the life of the 
President, and that the statement not be the 
result of mistake, duress, or coercion. 
We rejected a subjective intent requirement 
that the defendant “intended at least to 
convey the impression that the threat was a 
serious one.” We found “any subjective test 
potentially frustrates the purposes of section 
871—to prevent not only actual threats on 
the President's life, but also the harmful 
consequences which flow from such 
threats.” We have held the same “knowingly 
and willfully” mens rea Kosma analyzed 
under 18 U.S.C. § 871, threats against the 
president, applies to § 875(c). United States 
v. Himelwright. Since our precedent is clear, 
the question is whether the Supreme Court 
decision in Virginia v. Black overturned this 
standard. 
The Supreme Court first articulated the true 
threats exception to speech protected under 
the First Amendment in Watts v. United 
States. During a rally opposing the Vietnam 
war, Watts told the crowd, “I am not going. 
If they ever make me carry a rifle the first 
man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” The 
Court reversed his conviction for making a 
threat against the president. “The Court 
articulated three factors supporting its 
finding: 1. the context was a political 
speech; 2. the statement was “expressly 
conditional”; and 3. “the reaction of the 
listeners” who “laughed after the statement 
was made.” The Court did not address the 
true threats exception again until Virginia v. 
Black in 2003.
 
In Virginia v. Black the Court considered a 
Virginia statute that banned burning a cross 
with the “intent of intimidating” and 
provided “[a]ny such burning of a cross 
shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to 
intimidate a person or group of persons.” 
The Court reviewed three separate 
convictions of defendants under the statute 
and concluded that intimidating cross 
burning could be proscribed as a true threat 
under the First Amendment. But the prima 
facie evidence provision violated due 
process, because it permitted a jury to 
convict whenever a defendant exercised his 
or her right to not put on a defense.  
The Court reviewed the historic and 
contextual meanings behind cross burning, 
and found it conveyed a political message, a 
cultural message, and a threatening message, 
depending on the circumstances. The Court 
then described the true threat exception 
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generally before analyzing the Virginia 
statute: 
“True threats” encompass those 
statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an 
intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or 
group of individuals. The speaker need 
not actually intend to carry out the threat. 
Rather, a prohibition on true threats 
“protect[s] individuals from the fear of 
violence” and “from the disruption that 
fear engenders,” in addition to protecting 
people “from the possibility that the 
threatened violence will occur.” 
Intimidation in the constitutionally 
proscribable sense of the word is a type 
of true threat, where a speaker directs a 
threat to a person or group of persons 
with the intent of placing the victim in 
fear of bodily harm or 
death. Respondents do not contest that 
some cross burnings fit within this 
meaning of intimidating speech, and 
rightly so. As noted in Part II, the history 
of cross burning in this country shows 
that cross burning is often intimidating, 
intended to create a pervasive fear in 
victims that they are a target of violence. 
Elonis contends that this definition of true 
threats means that the speaker must both 
intend to communicate and intend for the 
language to threaten the victim. But the 
Court did not have occasion to make such a 
sweeping holding, because the challenged 
Virginia statute already required a subjective 
intent to intimidate. We do not infer from 
the use of the term “intent” that the Court 
invalidated the objective intent standard the 
majority of circuits applied to true threats.
 
Instead, we read “statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious 
expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence” to mean that the speaker 
must intend to make the communication. It 
would require adding language the Court did 
not write to read the passage as “statements 
where the speaker means to communicate 
[and intends the statement to be understood 
as] a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence.” This is 
not what the Court wrote, and it is 
inconsistent with the logic animating the 
true threats exception. 
The “prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] 
individuals from the fear of violence’ and 
‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in 
addition to protecting people ‘from the 
possibility that the threatened violence will 
occur.’ ” Limiting the definition of true 
threats to only those statements where the 
speaker subjectively intended to threaten 
would fail to protect individuals from “the 
fear of violence” and the “disruption that 
fear engenders,” because it would protect 
speech that a reasonable speaker would 
understand to be threatening. 
Elonis further contends the 
unconstitutionality of the prima facie 
evidence provision in Black indicates a 
subjective intent to threaten is required. The 
Court found the fact that the defendant 
burned a cross could not be prima facie 
evidence of intent to intimidate. The Court 
explained that while cross burning was often 
employed as intimidation or a threat of 
physical violence against others, it could 
also function as a symbol of solidarity for 
those within the white supremacist 
movement. Less frequently, crosses had 
been burned outside of the white 
supremacist context, such as stage 
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performances. Since the burning of a cross 
could have a constitutionally-protected 
political message as well as a threatening 
message, the prima facie evidence provision 
failed to distinguish protected speech from 
unprotected threats. Furthermore, the prima 
facie evidence provision denied defendants 
the right to not put on a defense, since the 
prosecution did not have to produce any 
evidence of intent to intimidate, which was 
an element of the crime.   
We do not find that the unconstitutionality 
of Virginia's prima facie evidence provision 
means the true threats exception requires a 
subjective intent to threaten. First, the prima 
facie evidence provision did not allow the 
factfinder to consider the context to construe 
the meaning of the conduct, whereas the 
reasonable person standard does encompass 
context to determine whether the statement 
was a serious expression of intent to inflict 
bodily harm. Second, cross-burning is 
conduct that may or may not convey a 
meaning, as opposed to the language in this 
case which has inherent meaning in addition 
to the meaning derived from context. 
Finally, the prima facie evidence provision 
violated the defendant's due process rights to 
not put on a defense, because the defendant 
could be convicted even when the 
prosecution had not proven all the elements 
of the crime. That is not an issue here 
because the government had to prove that a 
reasonable person would foresee Elonis's 
statements would be understood as threats. 
The majority of circuits that have considered 
this question have not found the Supreme 
Court decision in Black to require a 
subjective intent to threaten. 
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. 
White considered the same criminal 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), and found the 
Court in Black “gave no indication it was 
redefining a general intent crime such as § 
875(c) to be a specific intent crime.” The 
Fourth Circuit reasoned that Black had 
analyzed a statute that included a specific 
intent element, whereas § 875(c) had 
consistently been applied as a general intent 
statute. The court further 
distinguished Black by noting the multiple 
meanings of cross-burning necessitated a 
finding of intent to distinguish protected 
speech from true threats. The court 
in White found this same problem did not 
exist for threatening language because it has 
no First Amendment value. Finally, the 
court found the general intent standard for § 
875(c) offenses did not chill “statements of 
jest or political hyperbole” because “any 
such statements will, under the objective 
test, always be protected by the 
consideration of the context and of how a 
reasonable recipient would understand the 
statement.”   
In United States v. Jeffries the Sixth Circuit 
agreed that Black does not require a 
subjective intent to threaten to convict 
under 18 U.S.C. § 
875(c). Because Black interpreted a statute 
that already had a subjective intent 
requirement, the Sixth Circuit found the 
Court was not presented with the question 
whether an objective intent standard is 
constitutional. Jeffries also found that the 
Court's ruling on the prima facie evidence 
provision did not address the specific intent 
question because “the statute lacked any 
standard at all.” Like the Fourth Circuit 
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in White, the Sixth Circuit explained that the 
prima facie evidence provision failed to 
distinguish between protected speech and 
threats by not allowing for consideration of 
any contextual factors. In contrast, “[t]he 
reasonable-person standard winnows out 
protected speech because, instead of 
ignoring context, it forces jurors to examine 
the circumstances in which a statement is 
made.” The Ninth Circuit took a different 
view, and found the true threats definition 
in Black requires the speaker both intend to 
communicate and “intend for his language 
to threaten the victim.” The Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that the unconstitutionality of the 
prima facie provision meant that the Court 
required a finding of intent to threaten for all 
speech labeled as “true threats,” and not just 
cross burning. “We are therefore bound to 
conclude that speech may be deemed 
unprotected by the First Amendment as a 
‘true threat’ only upon proof that the speaker 
subjectively intended the speech as a 
threat.”   
Regardless of the state of the law in the 
Ninth Circuit, we find that Black does not 
alter our precedent. We agree with the 
Fourth Circuit that Black does not clearly 
overturn the objective test the majority of 
circuits applied to § 875(c). Black does not 
say that the true threats exception requires a 
subjective intent to threaten. Furthermore, 
our standard does require a finding of intent 
to communicate. The jury had to find Elonis 
“knowingly and willfully” transmitted a 
“communication containing ... [a] threat to 
injure the person of another.” A threat is 
made “knowingly” as when it is “made 
intentionally and not [as] the result of 
mistake, coercion or duress.” A threat is 
made willfully when “a reasonable person 
would foresee that the statement would be 
interpreted by those to whom the maker 
communicates the statement as a serious 
expression of an intention to inflict bodily 
harm.” This objective intent standard 
protects non-threatening speech while 
addressing the harm caused by true threats. 
Accordingly, the Kosma objective intent 
standard applies to this case and the District 
Court did not err in instructing the jury. 
B. 
Elonis contends the indictment was 
insufficient because it did not quote the 
language of the allegedly threatening 
statements. An indictment “must be a plain, 
concise, and definite written statement of the 
essential facts constituting the offense 
charged.” An indictment is sufficient when 
it “(1) contains the elements of the offense 
intended to be charged, (2) sufficiently 
apprises the defendant of what he must be 
prepared to meet, and (3) allows the 
defendant to show with accuracy to what 
extent he may plead a former acquittal or 
conviction in the event of a subsequent 
prosecution.”  We have found an indictment 
is sufficient “where it informs the defendant 
of the statute he is charged with violating, 
lists the elements of a violation under the 
statute, and specifies the time period during 
which the violations occurred.” 
In Huet we found an indictment for aiding 
and abetting a felon in possession of a 
firearm was sufficient because it alleged the 
previous felony conviction of the principal, 
the time period of the violation and the 
specific weapon involved, and alleged the 
defendant “knowingly aided and abetted 
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Hall's possession of that firearm.”  “No 
more was required to allow Huet to prepare 
her defense and invoke double jeopardy.”  
The Eighth Circuit considered an indictment 
that did not include the verbatim contents of 
a letter, the date it was written, or the name 
of the author.  The indictment for 
communicating a threat to injure with the 
intent to extort merely stated the letter 
threatened to harm the reputation of the 
victim with intent to extort. Since the 
indictment summarized the contents of the 
letter, provided the date it was mailed and 
the name of the addressee, the Eighth Circuit 
found there could be no confusion as to the 
elements and subject of the crime. 
To find a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) a 
defendant must transmit in interstate or 
foreign commerce a communication 
containing a threat to injure or kidnap a 
person. Here the indictment on Count 2 
stated: 
On or about November 6, 2010, through 
on or about November 15, 2010, in 
Bethlehem, in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, defendant 
ANTHONY DOUGLAS ELONIS 
knowingly and willfully transmitted in 
interstate and foreign commerce, via a 
computer and the Internet, a 
communication to others, that is, a 
communication containing a threat to 
injure the person of another, specifically, 
a threat to injure and kill T. E., a person 
known to the grand jury. In violation 
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 
875(c). 
The indictment on the other counts was 
identical, but stated each date of the threat, 
the nature of the threat, and the subjects of 
the threat. Count 3 alleged “a threat to injure 
employees of the Pennsylvania State Police 
and the Berks County Sheriff's Department”; 
Count 4 alleged “a threat to injure a 
kindergarten class of elementary school 
children”; and Count 5 alleged “a threat to 
injure an agent of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.” Elonis contends the 
indictment was deficient because they did 
not include the allegedly threatening 
statements. 
The indictment was sufficient because the 
counts describe the elements of the 
violation, the nature of the threat, the subject 
of the threat, and the time period of the 
alleged violation. For example, Count Four 
alleged defendant communicated over the 
internet on November 16, 2010 “a threat to 
injure a kindergarten class.” If Elonis had 
already been charged with this statement, 
the indictment provided enough information 
to challenge a subsequent prosecution. 
Based on the indictment, defendant was 
notified he needed to dispute that the 
statement was a threat, that he 
communicated the statement, and that he 
transmitted the statement through interstate 
commerce. Moreover, like the defendant 
in Keys, Elonis was able to identify which 
internet communications the indictment 
described, since he did not raise the issue 
until after trial. 
C. 
Elonis contends there was insufficient 
evidence to convict on Counts 3 and 5 of the 
indictment because the statements on which 
they were based were not threats. “A claim 
of insufficiency of evidence places a very 
heavy burden on the appellant.” “[T]he 
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relevant question is whether, after viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
1. 
Elonis contends Count 3 was based on a 
conditional statement, which he asserts 
cannot be a true threat. In Watts the 
Supreme Court found the conditional nature 
of defendant's statement to be one of the 
three factors demonstrating it was not a true 
threat. Elonis posted the following on his 
Facebook page: 
Fold up your PFA and put it in your 
pocket 
Is it thick enough to stop a bullet? 
Try to enforce an Order 
That was improperly granted in the first 
place 
Me thinks the judge needs an education 
on true threat jurisprudence 
And prison time will add zeroes to my 
settlement 
Which you won't see a lick 
Because you suck dog dick in front of 
children 
* * * 
And if worse comes to worse 
I've got enough explosives to take care of 
the state police and the sheriff's 
department 
[link: Freedom of Speech, 
www.wikipedia.org] 
We considered the impact of conditional 
statements on the true threat analysis 
in Kosma. We found that Watts did not hold 
conditional statements can never be true 
threats. We explained the conditional 
statements in Watts “were dependent on the 
defendant's induction into the armed 
forces—a condition which the defendant 
stated would never happen.” Because the 
defendant's threats in Kosma stated a precise 
time and place for carrying out the alleged 
threats, they were true threats. 
Here the District Court found that a 
reasonable jury could find the statement to 
be a true threat. Unlike in Watts, Elonis did 
not vow the condition precedent would 
never occur. However, this case is also 
unlike Kosma, where the statement included 
a particular time and place. Elonis's 
statement only conveys a vague timeline or 
condition. But, taken as a whole, a jury 
could have found defendant was threatening 
to use explosives on officers who “[t]ry to 
enforce an Order” of protection that was 
granted to his wife. Since there is no rule 
that a conditional statement cannot be a true 
threat—the words and context can 
demonstrate whether the statement was a 
serious expression of intent to harm—and 
we give substantial deference to a jury's 
verdict, there was not insufficient evidence 
for the jury to find the statement was a 
threat. 
2. 
Defendant contends that the statement on 
which Count 5 is based is a description of 
past conduct, not a future intent to harm: 
You know your shit's ridiculous when 
you have the FBI knockin' at yo' door 
Little Agent Lady stood so close 
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Took all the strength I had not to turn the 
bitch ghost 
Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her 
throat Leave her bleedin' from her jugular 
in the arms of her partner 
[laughter] 
So the next time you knock, you best be 
serving a warrant 
And bring yo' SWAT and an explosives 
expert while you're at it 
Cause little did y'all know, I was strapped 
wit' a bomb 
Why do you think it took me so long to 
get dressed with no shoes on? 
I was jus' waitin' for y'all to handcuff me 
and pat me down 
Touch the detonator in my pocket and 
we're all goin' 
[BOOM!] 
A threat under § 875(c) is a communication 
“expressing an intent to inflict injury in the 
present or future.” It was possible for a 
reasonable jury to conclude that the 
statement “the next time you knock, best be 
serving a warrant [a]nd bring yo' SWAT and 
an explosives expert” coupled with the past 
reference to a bomb was a threat to use 
explosives against the agents “the next 
time.” Indeed, the phrase “the next time” 
refers to the future, not a past event. 
Accordingly, a reasonable jury could have 
found the statement was a true threat. 
D. 
Elonis contends the jury instruction stating 
communications that travel over the internet 
necessarily travel in interstate commerce 
violated his due process rights because the 
government was required to prove interstate 
transmission as an element of the crime. The 
District Court instructed the jury: “Because 
of the interstate nature of the Internet, if you 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant used the Internet in 
communicating a threat, then that 
communication traveled in interstate 
commerce.” 
In United States v. MacEwan we explained 
the difference between interstate 
transmission and interstate commerce. The 
defendant in MacEwan contended the 
government failed to prove he received child 
pornography through interstate commerce 
because a Comcast witness testified it was 
impossible to know whether a particular 
transmission traveled through computer 
servers located entirely within Pennsylvania, 
or to any other server in the United 
States.  “[W]e conclude[d] that because of 
the very interstate nature of the Internet, 
once a user submits a connection request to 
a website server or an image is transmitted 
from the website server back to [the] user, 
the data has traveled in interstate 
commerce.” “Having concluded that the 
Internet is an instrumentality and channel of 
interstate commerce.... [i]t is sufficient that 
MacEwan downloaded those images from 
the Internet, a system that is inexorably 
intertwined with interstate commerce.”  
Elonis distinguishes MacEwan by stating 
that in that case the government presented 
evidence on how the internet worked. But 
the government's evidence in MacEwan did 
not show that any one of the defendant's 
internet transmissions traveled outside of 
Pennsylvania.
 
We found that fact to be 
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irrelevant to the question of interstate 
commerce because submitting data on the 
internet necessarily means the data travels in 
interstate commerce. Instead, we held “[i]t is 
sufficient that [the defendant] downloaded 
those images from the Internet.” Based on 
our conclusion that proving internet 
transmission alone is sufficient to prove 
transmission through interstate commerce, 
the District Court did not err in instructing 
the jury. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons we will uphold 
Elonis's convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 
875(c). 
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“On the Next Docket:  How the First Amendment Applies to Social Media” 
 
The New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
June 30, 2014 
 
Just four years ago, the Supreme Court 
issued a hesitant and muddled decision in a 
privacy case, saying it was best to move 
slowly when ruling on an “emerging 
technology before its role in society has 
become clear.” 
The cutting-edge innovation of the case: 
pagers. 
That decision, and the occasional oddball 
question from the bench, earned the justices 
a reputation as doddering technophobes. 
But the final weeks of the court’s current 
term left a different impression. In major 
decisions on software patents, smartphones, 
and Internet streaming, the justices seemed 
savvy. 
Now there is a new challenge looming on 
the docket for the term that starts in October, 
one that will require the court to consider 
how the First Amendment applies to social 
media. 
The case concerns Anthony Elonis, who was 
prosecuted for making threats on Facebook 
in the form of rap lyrics after his wife left 
him in 2010. 
He vented his frustration using the nom de 
rap Tone Dougie. His language was laced 
with brutally violent images. 
He suggested that his son might consider a 
Halloween costume that included his 
estranged wife’s “head on a stick.” He 
talked about “making a name for myself” 
with a school shooting, saying, “Hell hath 
no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten 
class.” He fantasized about killing an F.B.I. 
agent. 
His wife, Tara Elonis, understood the posts 
as threats. 
“I felt like I was being stalked,” she 
testified. “I felt extremely afraid for mine 
and my children’s and my family’s lives.” 
But it is less clear that Mr. Elonis meant his 
words that way. He said he was “just an 
aspiring rapper,” and it is not hard to find 
rap lyrics just as lurid and violent. 
Several of the posts included disclaimers 
and other indications that they were not in 
earnest. He adapted one post almost 
wholesale from a sketch by a comedy group, 
The Whitest Kids U’ Know. The Halloween 
post ended with an emoticon of a face with a 
tongue sticking out. 
“Art is about pushing the limits,” he wrote. 
“I’m willing to go to jail for my 
constitutional rights.” 
Did his intent matter? The lower court said 
no. All the prosecution had to prove, the trial 
judge ruled, was that a “reasonable person” 
would foresee that others would view his 
statements “as a serious expression of an 
intention to inflict bodily injury or take the 
life of an individual.” 
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The judge said that he did not mean to make 
“something said in a joking manner or an 
outburst of transitory anger” into a crime. 
But almost anyone who has ever sent an 
email knows how hard it is to detect those 
things without the cues that body language 
and tone of voice provide. 
Mr. Elonis was convicted under a federal 
law that makes it a crime to communicate 
“any threat to injure the person of another.” 
The sentence was 44 months. 
The case is one of many recent prosecutions 
“for alleged threats conveyed on new media, 
including Facebook, YouTube and Twitter,” 
according to a brief supporting Mr. Elonis 
from several First Amendment groups. 
In urging the Supreme Court not to hear Mr. 
Elonis’s case, the Justice Department said 
his intent should make no difference. A 
perceived threat creates “fear and 
disruption,” the brief said, “regardless of 
whether the speaker subjectively intended 
the statement to be innocuous.” 
Mr. Elonis’s lawyers did not deny that their 
approach would allow some statements with 
“undesirable effects.” But they said the First 
Amendment should tolerate those effects 
rather than “imprisoning a person for 
negligently misjudging how others would 
construe his words.” 
The First Amendment does not protect all 
speech. There are exceptions for libel, 
incitement, obscenity and fighting words, 
and one for “true threats,” which is at issue 
in Mr. Elonis’s case. 
The Supreme Court has not given a 
definitive answer to the question of whether 
intent matters in threat cases. But in 1969 it 
threw out a case against a draft protestor 
charged with threatening President Lyndon 
B. Johnson. “If they ever make me carry a 
rifle,” the protestor said, “the first man I 
want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” 
The remark was not a true threat, the court 
ruled, because it was conditional, made at a 
rally and greeted by laughter. But context is 
harder to gauge online. 
The case, Elonis v. United States, No. 13-
983, will be argued in the fall. It will again 
require the justices to confront a new 
technology and assess the meaning of the 
First Amendment in the age of the emoticon. 
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“Are Facebook Threats Real? The Supreme Court Will Soon Decide.” 
Slate 
Dahlia Lithwick 
June 16, 2014 
 
Monday morning the Supreme Court agreed 
to hear an important First Amendment 
challenge that will attempt to sort out—after 
years of ambiguity and confusion in the 
lower courts—when threats, specifically 
Internet threats, should be taken seriously by 
the law. The case will be heard in the term 
that begins next October and will hopefully 
clarify whether threats of violence made 
over Facebook and other social media 
should be judged by whether the threatening 
speaker intended to harm anyone or whether 
the listener was genuinely afraid of being 
harmed. In light of the recent Isla Vista, 
California, shooting and other acts of 
violence that were telegraphed in social 
media, the answer to that question could not 
be more urgent. 
So what do you do when you come across a 
Facebook posting that reads: 
That’s it, I’ve had about enough 
I’m checking out and making a name for 
myself 
Enough elementary schools in a ten mile 
radius 
to initiate the most heinous school shooting 
ever-imagined 
And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a 
kindergarten-class 
The only question is . . . which one? 
Is that a threat to shoot up a school? Or just 
some guy writing terrible rap lyrics? 
Anthony Elonis, an eastern Pennsylvania 
man, has served more than three years in 
prison for posting threats on Facebook. 
After his wife took their two kids and left 
him in 2010, he got fired from his job. He 
then began a series of dark and vengeful 
rants, sometimes in the form of rap lyrics 
like the above, about threats to kill his wife, 
a female FBI agent, and a class of 
kindergartners. Elonis contends that these 
weren’t ever real threats—that they were 
“therapeutic” and that these words are 
protected First Amendment speech. He 
claims that the lyrics were not intended as 
warnings of real violence and that they were 
a harmless way to express his severe 
depression and frustration after his wife left. 
In one post, Elonis wrote about smothering 
his wife with a pillow and dumping her body 
in a creek so it would look like a rape. In 
another he wrote: “There’s one way to love 
you but a thousand ways to kill you. I’m not 
going to rest until your body is a mess, 
soaked in blood and dying from all the little 
cuts. Hurry up and die, bitch, so I can bust 
this nut all over your corpse from atop your 
shallow grave. I used to be a nice guy but 
then you became a slut. Guess it’s not your 
fault you liked your daddy raped you. So 
hurry up and die, bitch, so I can forgive 
you.” 
Elonis wrote about smothering his wife and 
dumping her body in a creek but contends 
these weren’t ever real threats. 
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After an FBI agent visited him to follow up 
on the earlier threats, Elonis posted a rap 
about slitting her throat and claimed he’d 
had a bomb strapped to him throughout the 
interview. He was arrested in December 
2010 and tried before a jury under a federal 
law that prohibits the use of interstate 
communications of threats to harm 
individuals. His wife testified that she was 
objectively terrified by the posts, especially 
since they increased after she filed a 
“protection from abuse” order against him. 
“I felt like I was being stalked. I felt 
extremely afraid for mine and my children’s 
and my families’ lives,” she said at the trial. 
She also testified that Elonis rarely listened 
to rap music and that she had never seen him 
write rap lyrics over the course of their 
seven-year marriage. 
Elonis was convicted on four of the five 
federal charges and sentenced to 44 months 
in jail. 
The case deals with an area of First 
Amendment law known as “true threats.” 
These kinds of threats are unprotected under 
the First Amendment. The trick is figuring 
out whether Elonis’ speech was a true threat 
or not. At his trial, the jury was told that the 
legal standard for whether something is an 
unprotected “true threat” is if an objective 
person could consider Elonis’ posts to be 
threatening. Elonis claims that the correct 
test should look at whether he intended for 
the posts to be understood as threats. He also 
argues that his rap lyrics are important 
protected speech, no different from the rap 
lyrics created by the great artists. In his view 
the threatening and violent lyrics he was 
posting were emulating those of Eminem. 
(Elonis was careful to include some 
disclaimers among his writings, suggesting 
that this was all more art than threat, and 
also an act of First Amendment protest: “Art 
is about pushing limits,” he posted. “I’m 
willing to go to jail for my constitutional 
rights. Are you?”) 
The last time the high court scrutinized the 
“true threat” doctrine was in 2003, when it 
found that a Virginia law banning cross 
burning was unconstitutional because a “true 
threat” requires the speaker to communicate 
an intent to commit violence. (Justice 
Clarence Thomas was the lone dissenter.) In 
that case, the court defined true threats as 
“statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an 
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence 
to a particular individual or group of 
individuals.” Elonis read the Virginia case to 
say that the definition of true threats means 
that the speaker must truly intend to threaten 
the victim. 
Courts across the country have been split on 
whether the subjective intent of the speaker 
or the objective assessment of the listener is 
what matters when it comes to discerning a 
true threat. The 3
rd
 Circuit Court of Appeals, 
looking at the facts in Elonis’ case, held that 
if a statement causes a reasonable person to 
fear for her safety, that’s a true threat. Most 
other courts agree on that standard: a 
reasonable person’s objective interpretation 
controls the outcome. The 9
th
 Circuit on the 
other hand has taken the position that the 
speaker must have intended to communicate 
threat and “intend for his language to 
threaten the victim.” The Justice Department 
supports the 3
rd
 Circuit’s test, arguing that 
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the law must not only prevent real violence 
but also deter real fear. 
One of the confounding factors here is that 
the court hasn’t yet looked at the question of 
true threats through the lens of modern 
technology. Those urging the court to take 
the case argued that speeches at rallies and 
even cross burnings are fundamentally 
different from YouTube postings or tweets. 
Elonis claims that you can’t use an objective 
listener standard when you are dealing with 
the interpersonal and context-free 
conversation that takes place in the Wild 
West of social media. Elonis’ petition for 
Supreme Court review argues that “modern 
media allow personal reflections intended 
for a small audience (or no audience) to be 
viewed widely by people who are unfamiliar 
with the context in which the statements 
were made and thus who may interpret the 
statements much differently than the 
speakers intended.” 
In a column about the high stakes in this 
case, three law professors writing in support 
of Elonis explain that “information posted to 
social media sites is often disseminated and 
displayed in ways that users do not control 
or even understand, profoundly 
complicating attempts to determine a 
person’s intent in posting something or a 
‘reasonable’ person’s interpretation of 
it. Context becomes further complicated 
when a so-called threat is a lyric from a 
musical genre that often privileges highly 
exaggerated, confrontational and violent 
rhetoric.” 
Robert Richards, director of the 
Pennsylvania Center for the First 
Amendment at Penn State, argues that on the 
Internet, the recipient is not the issue 
anymore; that, unlike a letter, posts on social 
media may simply be left for anyone to find. 
In an interview with a Pennsylvania paper, 
Richards explained that people use social 
media “to say all kinds of things but they 
may not be directing it to a particular 
individual. They’re just venting their 
feelings.” 
This case is not only crucially important in 
that it will force the court to clarify its own 
“true threats” doctrine and finally apply it to 
social media to determine whether—
as Justice Stephen Breyer has suggested—
the whole world is a crowded theater. But 
perhaps it’s even more important in pushing 
the conversation about law enforcement, 
prosecution, and threats to include a much 
more sophisticated understanding of the 
ways in which the Internet is not just a rally 
or a letter. As Amanda Hess has explained 
so powerfully, women experience threats on 
social media in ways that can have crippling 
economic and psychological effects. At the 
margins, this is a case about the line 
between first amendment performance art, 
fantasy violence, real threats—and real fear. 
In a world in which men and women find it 
nearly impossible to agree on what’s an idle 
threat and what’s a legitimate one, it’s also a 
case about where that line lies, or whether 
there can be one. 
404 
 
“True Threats” 
First Amendment Center 
David L. Hudson Jr. 
May 12, 2008 
 
The First Amendment protects a wide swath 
of expression that many of us may find 
offensive, distasteful or even repugnant. The 
government cannot silence and punish 
speakers just because it dislikes their 
expression. Oftentimes, the First 
Amendment protects the flag-burner, the 
tobacco advertiser, the pornographer and the 
hateful speaker. 
However, First Amendment jurisprudence 
has never provided absolute protection to all 
forms of speech. There are several 
unprotected categories of expression, 
including but not limited to fighting words, 
obscenity, extortion, perjury and false 
advertising. Another unprotected category is 
the true threat. The First Amendment does 
not give a person the right to walk up to 
someone else and say “I am going to kill 
you” or to announce in an airport, “I am 
going to bomb this plane.” 
Yet the line between protected expression 
and an unprotected true threat is often hazy 
and uncertain. What if a speaker makes a 
seemingly threatening statement about a 
political figure through the use of 
hyperbole? What if a student says that if he 
receives a poor grade, he may “go 
Columbine”? What if an abortion protester 
talks about participating in a “war against 
abortionists”? 
Supreme Court case law 
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed a 
true-threat case in Watts v. United 
States (1969). Robert Watts, a young 
African-American man, allegedly stated 
during a protest in Washington D.C.: 
“They always holler at us to get an 
education. And now I have already 
received my draft classification as 1-A 
and I have got to report for my physical 
this Monday morning. I am not going. If 
they ever make me carry a rifle the first 
man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. 
They are not going to make me kill my 
black brothers.” 
Prosecutors charged Watts with violating a 
federal law that prohibits threats against the 
president. Watts countered that his statement 
was a form of crude political opposition. A 
federal jury convicted Watts of a felony for 
violating the law and a federal appeals court 
affirmed his conviction. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Watts’ 
statement was political hyperbole rather than 
a true threat. 
“We agree with [Watts] that his only offense 
here was ‘a kind of very crude offensive 
method of stating a political opposition to 
the President,’” the Court wrote in a per 
curiam opinion. “Taken in context, and 
regarding the expressly conditional nature of 
the statement and the reaction of the 
listeners, we do not see how it could be 
interpreted otherwise.” 
Unfortunately, the Court in Watts failed to 
define what constitutes a true threat. Other 
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courts considering true-threats cases have 
focused on certain elements 
ofWatts, including: (1) the fact that the 
comments were made accompanying a 
political debate; (2) the conditional nature of 
the threat; and (3) the context of the speech, 
as apparently several listeners laughed after 
Watts spoke. 
The Supreme Court next addressed true 
threats, though not directly, in another case 
with connections to the civil rights 
movement. In NAACP. v. Claiborne 
Hardware (1982), the Court unanimously 
reversed a finding that Charles Evers and the 
NAACP could be found civilly liable for 
speech advocating the boycott of certain 
white-owned businesses. Evers, field 
secretary for the NAACP in Mississippi, had 
given impassioned speeches encouraging 
fellow African-Americans to participate in 
the boycott. He made some highly charged 
statements, such as “If we catch any of you 
going in any of them racist stores, we’re 
gonna break your damn neck.” 
The Court found that Evers’ comments did 
not constitute fighting words, incitement to 
imminent lawless action or a true threat. It 
concluded that “Evers’ addresses did not 
exceed the bounds of protected speech.” 
While most of the analysis centered on 
whether Evers’ speech incited imminent 
lawless action, the case added to 
the Watts legacy that charged political 
advocacy is unlikely to rise to the level of a 
true threat. Unfortunately, it provided little 
guidance for determining whether speech 
constitutes a true threat. 
“Claiborne Hardware is one of the most 
difficult cases to analyze,” wrote Stanford 
Law Professor Jennifer Rothman in her 
incisive 2001 article, “Freedom of Speech 
and True Threats” for the Harvard Journal 
of Law and Public Policy. “The decision 
itself is fairly opaque about its basis for 
determining that Evers’ speech did not 
constitute true threats.” 
The high court more directly addressed true 
threats in a pair of Virginia cross-burning 
cases collectively known as Virginia v. 
Black (2003). One case involved a Ku Klux 
Klan leader named Barry Elton Black, who 
burned a cross in a field with the permission 
of the property owner. The other case 
involved two individuals who burned 
crosses in the yard of a neighboring African-
American family. In separate cases that 
became consolidated, the Supreme Court 
examined the constitutionality of a Virginia 
state law that prohibited “any person or 
group of persons, with the intent of 
intimidating any person or group of persons, 
to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the 
property of another, a highway or other 
public place.” 
Another provision of the law created a 
presumption that all cross-burnings were 
done with an intent to intimidate. In its 
decision, the Court upheld the bulk of the 
Virginia law, but invalidated the section that 
provided that all cross-burnings were 
presumed to be intimidating. 
In deciding the case, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor in her plurality opinion offered a 
definition of true threats: 
“‘True threats’ encompass those 
statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an 
intent to commit an act of unlawful 
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violence to a particular individual or 
group of individuals. The speaker need 
not actually intend to carry out the threat. 
Rather, a prohibition on true threats 
protect[s] individuals from the fear of 
violence and from the disruption that fear 
engenders, in addition to protecting 
people from the possibility that the 
threatened violence will occur.” 
She added, “intimidation in the 
constitutionally proscribable sense of the 
word is a type of true threat, where a speaker 
directs a threat to a person or group of 
persons with the intent of placing the victim 
in fear of bodily harm or death.” 
Lack  of  clarity 
 
Many legal experts say that the Supreme 
Court’s true-threat cases have failed to 
provide clear guidance for lower courts. 
Commentator Paul T. Crane in a 
2006 Virginia Law Review article “True 
Threats and the Issue of Intent,” wrote that 
“in providing a definition, the Court created 
more confusion than elucidation” and 
“spawned as many questions as answers.” 
Duke law professor Steven Gey, in a 2005 
article for the Notre Dame Law Review, “A 
Few Questions About Cross Burning, 
Intimidation and Free Speech,” said: 
“Justice O’Connor’s opinion in the cross 
burning case borders on the incoherent.” 
Many lower courts have struggled with the 
Court’s decision in Black because it is 
unclear what level of intent is necessary for 
a speaker’s utterance to be considered a true 
threat. In other words, must a speaker 
subjectively intend to intimidate or threaten 
others? Or is it sufficient if the speaker 
makes a comment that a recipient reasonably 
believes is a threat? Should true threats be 
interpreted under a “reasonable speaker” or 
“reasonable recipient” standard? Is there a 
difference between a true threat and 
intimidation or is intimidation a special 
subset of the more general category of true 
threats? 
Lower courts struggle to define true threats 
and apply the Court’s precedents 
from Watts and Black. Some courts have 
determined that in order for speech to 
constitute a true threat, the speaker must 
subjectively intend to threaten someone. 
This doesn’t mean that the speaker must 
actually intend to carry out the threat. It does 
mean, however, that the speaker must 
subjectively intend that his or her comments 
be interpreted as a true threat. 
A three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals adopted this view in 
United States v. Cassel (2005), a case 
involving a man who allegedly intimidated 
prospective buyers to dissuade them from 
purchasing a plot of land next to his own. 
Jury instructions in his case provided: 
“Intimidation is to make a person timid or 
fearful through the use of words and conduct 
that would put an ordinary, reasonable 
person in fear or apprehension for the 
purpose of compelling or deterring legal 
conduct of that person.” 
For the 9th Circuit, the jury instructions 
were constitutionally deficient because they 
did not require the government to prove that 
the defendant made the comments with the 
intent to intimidate the prospective buyers. 
However, other courts interpret Virginia v. 
Black as requiring only that the speaker 
knowingly intended to communicate to 
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another person. These courts do not require 
that it be proven that the speaker 
subjectively intended to threaten someone. 
Rather, they focus on whether there was an 
intent to communicate and whether an 
objective or reasonable recipient would 
regard it as a serious expression of harm. 
For example, a three-judge panel of the 5th 
Circuit in Porter v. Ascension School 
District (2004) wrote: 
“Speech is a true threat and therefore 
unprotected if an objectively reasonable 
person would interpret the speech as a 
serious expression of an intent to cause a 
present or future harm. The protected 
status of the threatening speech is not 
determined by whether the speaker had 
the subjective intent to carry out the 
threat; rather, to lose the protection of the 
First Amendment and be lawfully 
punished, the threat must be intentionally 
or knowingly communicated to either the 
object of the threat or a third person.” 
Even courts that agree there is no subjective-
intent requirement disagree over how to 
apply the objective requirement. Courts 
disagree whether the objective test should be 
applied from the perspective of a reasonable 
speaker (the person allegedly making the 
threat or who should have known that his 
words could be interpreted as threatening) or 
the reasonable recipient (the intended 
target). Some courts avoid the labeling of 
reasonable speaker or recipient and simply 
apply a reasonable-person standard. 
Still other courts employ a multi-factor test 
to determine whether speech constitutes a 
true threat. In United States v. 
Dinwiddie (1996), the 8th Circuit examined 
whether an abortion protester engaged in 
making true threats in violation of the 
Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act 
(FACE). The court applied a test consisting 
of what came to be known as the 
“Dinwiddie factors”: 
 The reaction of the recipient of the 
threat and of other listeners. 
 Whether the threat was conditional. 
 Whether the threat was 
communicated directly to its victim. 
 Whether the maker of the threat had 
made similar statements to the victim 
in the past. 
 Whether the victim had reason to 
believe that the maker of the threat 
had a propensity to engage in 
violence. 
Conclusion 
True-threat jurisprudence remains a 
muddled mess. Courts often have trouble 
determining whether violent expression 
should be evaluated under the “incitement to 
imminent lawless action” standard or under 
a true-threats line of analysis. 
In a high-profile case involving a Web site 
known as the Nuremberg Files, which listed 
abortion providers with lines drawn through 
names if they were killed, a three-judge 
panel of the 9th Circuit said Brandenburg v. 
Ohio (1969) and its requirement of 
imminency must be applied. That is, a threat 
must be explicit and likely to cause 
“imminent lawless action.” The panel ruled 
that neither was the case and that the speech 
on the Web site was protected. But, the full 
panel of the 9th Circuit eventually ruled 6-5 
that the case was more properly evaluated 
under true-threat analysis and that the Web 
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site did in fact constitute a true threat. In 
2003, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to 
review this ruling. 
Lower courts are far from consistent in how 
they determine whether speech is truly 
threatening. Some courts interpret Supreme 
Court case law to require subjective intent, 
while others apply different versions of an 
“objective” test as some form of general 
intent to communicate. 
The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into 
the thickets of true threats in Virginia v. 
Black seemingly raises as many questions as 
it provides answers. Particularly interesting 
will be whether intimidation becomes a 
synonym for, or a subset of, true threats. It 
may take further clarification from the 
Supreme Court to resolve these thorny 
questions and provide more guidance on 
when speech crosses the line from protected 
speech into unprotected threats or 
intimidation. 
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“3rd Cir. Re-Examines 1st Amendment True Threat Exception” 
Find Law 
Gabriella Khorasanee 
September 27, 2013 
 
People get carried away on Facebook. But 
when is a rant no longer a rant? 
The Third Circuit re-examined its First 
Amendment jurisprudence to redefine the 
boundaries of true threats and came to a 
reasonable conclusion: Objective intent is 
enough (pun intended). 
Facebook Threats 
Anthony Elonis was estranged from his 
wife, and as a result of his depression and 
inappropriate behavior was fired from his 
job. What followed was a campaign of 
Facebook rants that included references 
including, but not limited to, his estranged 
wife's "head on a stick," an elementary 
school shooting, detonating explosives, and 
killing his wife, cops, kids, co-workers, 
along with FBI agents. Violent enough for 
you? (For your daily dose of the disturbing 
and crazy, read the full opinion). 
Elonis didn't think so, but a jury did; he was 
convicted on four of the five counts brought 
against him for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 
875(c), which prohibits the use of interstate 
communications of threats to harm 
individuals. His prior attempt to dismiss the 
indictment failed, as well as several post-
conviction motions. 
On appeal, Elonis' main argument was 
whether the true threats exception to First 
Amendment speech protection requires an 
objective or subjective intent to threat. 
True Threat Jurisprudence 
In 1991, the Third Circuit in United States v. 
Korma held that an objective standard 
applied to determine whether a statement 
was a true threat -- that is, "a statement is a 
true threat when a reasonable speaker would 
foresee the statement would be interpreted 
as a threat." Elonis argued that the Supreme 
Court's subsequent decision in Virginia v. 
Black required a subjective intent to 
threaten. 
In Virginia v. Black, the Court reviewed a 
statute that prohibited the burning of crosses 
intended to intimidate and defined cross-
burning as prima facie evidence of intention 
to intimidate. The Supreme Court held that 
cross-burning could be prohibited, but the 
language of the statute failed on due process 
grounds because the prima facie evidence 
clause denied a defendants' "right to not put 
on a defense." 
Circuit Split 
The Third Circuit declined to accept Elonis' 
interpretation, in accord with the 
Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits. The Third 
Circuit found that the Black case turned on 
the prima facie evidence exception, which 
was not present here. Instead, here, the court 
found that the context of the statements was 
taken into account, and the Government still 
had to "prove that a reasonable person 
would foresee Elonis's statements would be 
understood as threats." The Third Circuit 
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declined to accept the Ninth 
Circuit's reading of Black, which would 
require the speaker to intend to both 
communicate and threaten. 
The Supreme Court has not taken on many 
true threat cases, but seeing that the circuits 
have been in disagreement for several years, 
and that there is only one circuit with a 
differing interpretation, it may take more 
division among the circuits for the High 
Court to clarify the true threat exception.
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Holt v. Hobbs 
13-6827 
 
Ruling Below: Gregory Houston Holt v. Ray Hobbs, 509 Fed.Appx. 561 (Mem) (8th Cir. 2013), 
cert granted, 134 S.Ct. 1490 (2014). 
 
Gregory Holt, also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad, filed a pro se Complaint pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) grooming policy 
violates his constitutional rights and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA). Mr. Muhammad is a Salafi Muslim who seeks to grow a beard in observance of his 
religion but in contravention to the ADC grooming policy, which only allows beard growth up to 
a quarter inch for inmates with diagnosed dermatological problems. 
 
Question Presented: Whether the Arkansas Department of Corrections grooming policy violates 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U. S. C. § 2000cc et seq., 
to the extent that it prohibits petitioner from growing a one-half-inch beard in accordance with 
his religious beliefs. 
 
 
Gregory Houston Holt, also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad, Plaintiff - Appellant 
v. 
Ray Hobbs, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction; Gaylon Lay, Warden, 
Cummins Unit, ADC; D W Tate, Captain, Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of 
Correction; V. R. Robertson, Major, Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of 
Correction; M. Richardson, Sgt., Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of 
Correction; Larry May, Chief Deputy Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, 
Defendants – Appellees 
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit 
Decided on June 12, 2013 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
PER CURIAM 
In this action challenging the Arkansas 
Department of Correction (ADC) grooming 
policy under the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 
inmate Gregory Holt (also known as Abdul 
Maalik Muhammad) appeals the district 
court’s  order dismissing his action after an 
evidentiary hearing. 
In his complaint and motion for a 
preliminary injunction and temporary 
restraining order, Mr. Holt asserted that one 
of his fundamentalist Muslim beliefs was 
that he must grow a beard, but defendants 
substantially burdened his ability to practice 
his religion by enforcing ADC’s grooming 
policy, which allowed trimmed mustaches 
but otherwise no facial hair, with quarter-
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inch beards permitted only for a diagnosed 
dermatological problem. Mr. Holt sought 
permission to maintain a half-inch beard as a 
compromise position, to balance his 
religious beliefs with ADC’s security needs. 
The district court initially granted temporary 
injunctive relief. The court vacated its order 
and dismissed the complaint, however, after 
the hearing produced evidence that Mr. Holt 
had a prayer rug and a list of distributors of 
Islamic material, he was allowed to 
correspond with a religious advisor, and he 
was allowed to maintain the required diet 
and observe religious holidays; that the 
grooming policy helped prevent inmates 
from concealing contraband, drugs, or 
weapons; that an inmate who grew a beard 
could change his appearance quickly by 
shaving; that affording special privileges to 
an individual inmate could result in his 
being targeted by other inmates; and that 
prison officials believed the grooming 
policy was necessary to further ADC’s 
interest in prison security. 
Following careful review, we conclude that 
defendants met their burden under RLUIPA 
of establishing that ADC’s grooming policy 
was the least restrictive means of furthering 
a compelling penological interest, 
notwithstanding Mr. Holt’s citation to cases 
indicating that prisons in other jurisdictions 
have been able to meet their security needs 
while allowing inmates to maintain facial 
hair. 
Accordingly, we affirm, but we modify the 
judgment to reflect that the dismissal does 
not count as a “strike” for purposes of 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(g). 
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“Supreme Court Agrees to Weigh an Inmate’s Right to Grow a Beard for 
Religious Reasons” 
New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
March 3, 2014 
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to 
decide whether prison officials in Arkansas 
may prohibit inmates from growing beards 
in accordance with their religious beliefs. 
The policy was challenged by Gregory H. 
Holt, who is serving a life sentence for 
burglary and domestic battery. Mr. Holt said 
his Muslim faith required him to grow a 
beard. 
The state’s policy allows trimmed 
mustaches, along with quarter-inch beards 
for those with dermatologic problems. 
Prison officials said the ban on other facial 
hair was needed to promote “health and 
hygiene,” to minimize “opportunities for 
disguise” and to help prevent the 
concealment of contraband. 
Mr. Holt sued under the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act, a federal 
law that requires prison officials to show 
that policies that burden religious practices 
advance a compelling penological interest 
and use the least restrictive means to do so. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, in St. Louis, ruled in June 
that the justifications offered by the officials 
satisfied that standard. 
Mr. Holt filed a handwritten petition in 
September asking the justices to hear his 
case, Holt v. Hobbs, No. 13-6827, pointing 
out that other courts had struck down 
policies banning beards in prisons. In an 
interim order in November, the Supreme 
Court ordered that Mr. Holt be allowed to 
grow a half-inch beard. 
In their response to Mr. Holt’s Supreme 
Court petition, prison officials told the 
justices that “homemade darts and other 
weapons” and “cellphone SIM cards” could 
be concealed in even half-inch beards. They 
added that they did not welcome the task of 
monitoring the lengths of inmates’ beards. 
In a reply brief, Mr. Holt, now represented 
by Douglas Laycock, a law professor at the 
University of Virginia, said 39 state 
corrections systems and the federal system 
allow prisoners to grow beards. He added 
that the justifications for the policy were 
illogical as there were easier places to hide 
contraband — shoes, say — than in a short 
beard. 
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“U.S. Justices Say Inmate Can Keep Beard While Contesting Policy” 
Reuters 
Lawrence Hurley 
November 14, 2013 
The Supreme Court on Thursday said an 
Arkansas prison inmate should be allowed to 
maintain a beard while he contests the 
prison's grooming policy. 
In an unusual order, the court said that 
Gregory Holt, 38, should be allowed to grow 
a beard of up to one-half of an inch in length 
in accordance with his Muslim beliefs. 
The court was responding to a handwritten 
request filed by Holt, who recounted his 
lengthy and unsuccessful attempt to fight the 
grooming policy. 
Holt is serving a life sentence for burglary 
and domestic battery at the Varner 
Supermax prison, according to the Arkansas 
Department of Correction's website. 
The Supreme Court's order said Holt could 
keep his beard while he files a petition with 
the court seeking review of a June appeals 
court decision that went against him. 
 
 
  
415 
 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona 
13-502 
 
Ruling Below: Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, 707 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2013), cert granted, 
134 S.Ct. 2900 (2014). 
 
Church and pastor seeking to place temporary signs announcing services filed suit claiming that 
town's sign ordinance, restricting size, duration, and location of temporary directional signs, 
violated right to free speech, free exercise of religion, and equal protection. The United States 
District Court for the District of Arizona denied church's motion for preliminary injunction 
barring enforcement of ordinance. Church appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and 
remanded in part. On remand, the District Court granted town summary judgment. Church and 
pastor appealed. 
 
Question Presented: Whether the Town of Gilbert's mere assertion that its sign code lacks a 
discriminatory motive renders its facially content-based sign code content-neutral and justifies 
the code's differential treatment of petitioners' religious signs. 
 
 
Clyde REED, Pastor and Good News Community Church, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v.  
TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZONA and Adam Adams, in his official capacity as Code 
Compliance Manager, Defendants-Appellees.  
 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
 
Decided on February 8, 2013 
 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
 
CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge: 
Good News Community Church and its 
pastor, Clyde Reed (referred to collectively 
as “Good News”), appeal from the district 
court's determination on remand from the 
Ninth Circuit that the Town of Gilbert's 
ordinance that restricts the size, duration and 
location of temporary directional signs does 
not discriminate between different forms of 
noncommercial speech in a unconstitutional 
manner. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert (9th Cir. 
2009), we held that the ordinance 
(sometimes referred to as the “Sign Code”) 
is not a content-based regulation and is a 
reasonable time, place and manner 
restriction. However, we remanded the case 
to the district court “to consider the First 
Amendment and Equal Protection claims 
that the Sign Code is unconstitutional in 
favoring some noncommercial speech over 
other noncommercial speech.”  
Accepting our opinion in Reed as law of the 
case, we conclude that the Sign Code is 
constitutional because the different 
treatment of types of noncommercial 
temporary signs are not content-based as 
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that term is defined in Reed, and the 
restrictions are tailored to serve significant 
governmental interests. In addition, we 
determine that the amendments to the Sign 
Code made by the Town of Gilbert 
(“Gilbert”) during the pendency of this 
appeal do not moot this case and that Good 
News may file a new action in the district 
court should it wish to challenge the new 
provisions of the Sign Code. 
I. 
Good News is a relatively small church with 
25 to 30 adult members and 4 to 10 children. 
“Members of Good News believe the Bible 
commands them to go and make disciples of 
all nations, and that they should carry out 
this command by reaching out to the 
community to meet together on a regular 
basis. To do so, they display signs 
announcing their services as an invitation for 
those in the community to attend.” Starting 
around 2002, Good News met at an 
elementary school in Gilbert. It presently 
rents space at an elementary school in 
Chandler, Arizona, which borders Gilbert. 
For a time, Good News placed about 17 
signs in the area surrounding its place of 
worship in Gilbert announcing the time and 
location of its services. In 2005, Good News 
received an advisory notice from Gilbert that 
it was violating the town's sign ordinance 
because “the signs were displayed outside 
the statutorily-limited time period.” For a 
while thereafter, Good News reduced the 
number of signs it erected and the amount of 
time its signs were in place, but friction with 
Gilbert persisted. In March 2008, Good 
News filed suit in federal court in Arizona 
alleging that Gilbert's Sign Code violated 
the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. The Sign Ordinances 
Like many municipalities, Gilbert regulates 
the display of outdoor signs. Section 
4.401(A) outlines the purposes for the Sign 
Code, namely, to “assure proper and 
efficient expression through visual 
communications involving signs compatible 
with the character and environment of the 
Town; to eliminate confusing, distracting, 
and unsafe signs; and to enhance the visual 
environment of the Town of Gilbert.” 
Under § 4.402(A), no person may erect a 
sign without first obtaining a sign permit, 
unless the sign is one exempted under § 
4.402(D). Section 4.402(D) lists nineteen 
different types of signs that are allowed 
without a permit.
 
Three of the types of 
exempted signs are of particular relevance: 
“Temporary Directional Signs Relating to 
Qualifying Event,” “Political Signs,” and 
“Ideological Signs.” 
Gilbert asserts, and Good News concedes, 
that Good News' signs are Temporary 
Directional Signs subject to the 
requirements of § 4.402(P). This subsection 
provides that “Temporary Directional Signs 
Relating to a Qualifying Event ... shall be no 
greater than 6 feet in height and 6 square 
feet in area,” “shall only be displayed up to 
12 hours before, during and 1 hour after the 
qualifying event ends,” “may be located off-
site and shall be placed at grade level,” and 
“shall be placed only with the permission of 
the owner of the property on which they are 
placed.” Additional restrictions include that 
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“[n]o more that 4 signs shall be displayed on 
a single property at any one time,” and that 
Temporary Directional Signs may not be 
placed “in a public right-of-way” or on 
“fences, boulders, planters, other signs, 
vehicles, utility facilities, or any structure.” 
A “Political Sign” is defined as a 
“temporary sign which supports candidates 
for office or urges action on any other matter 
on the ballot of primary, general and special 
elections.” Political Signs (a) may be up to 
32 square feet in size, (b) may be erected 
any time prior to an election but must be 
taken down within 10 days of the election, 
(c) are not limited in number, and (d) may 
be placed in the public right-of-way. An 
“Ideological Sign” is a “sign communicating 
a message or ideas for noncommercial 
purposes that is not a construction sign, 
directional sign, temporary directional sign, 
temporary directional sign relating to a 
qualified event, political sign, garage sale 
sign, or sign owned or required by a 
governmental agency.” Ideological Signs (a) 
may be up to 20 square feet in size, (b) are 
not limited in time, (c) are not limited in 
number, and (d) may be placed in the public 
right-of-way. 
B. Initial Proceedings in the District 
Court 
Gilbert initially stipulated to a preliminary 
injunction, but when Gilbert amended the 
Sign Code in a way that Good News 
believed continued to infringe on its 
constitutional rights, Good News filed a 
second motion for a preliminary injunction. 
In September 2008, the district court denied 
Good News' motion for an injunction, 
concluding that: (a) “§ 4.402(P) is a content-
neutral regulation, and [ ] it passes the 
applicable intermediate level of scrutiny;” 
and (b) the Sign Code “does not violate 
equal protection, as any uneven effects are 
an unintended consequence of the lawful 
content-neutral regulation.” Good News 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
C. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 587 F.3d 966 
(9th Cir. 2009) 
In November 2009 we basically affirmed the 
district court's denial of an injunction. In 
doing so, we made four determinations that 
guide our review in this appeal. 
1. Good News alleges an as-applied 
challenge to the Sign Code 
First, we held that Good News' challenge 
was an as-applied challenge, and not a facial 
challenge, to the Sign Code. We determined 
that Good News' attack on the ordinance 
was “basically a challenge to the ordinance 
as applied to [its] activities,” and therefore 
we limited our analysis of the 
constitutionality of the ordinance to its 
application to Good News. 
2. The Sign Code is not a content-based 
regulation 
Second, after reviewing the evolution of our 
opinions from Foti v. City of Menlo Park 
to Menotti v. City of Seattle and G.K. 
Limited Travel v. City of Lake Oswego 
(“G.K. Ltd.”), we determined the fact that an 
enforcement official had to read a sign did 
not mean that a ordinance is content-based. 
Instead, we concluded that “our focus 
should be on determining whether the 
ordinance targets certain content; whether 
the ordinance or exemption is based on 
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identification of a speaker or event instead 
of on content; and whether an enforcement 
officer would need to distinguish content to 
determine applicability of the ordinance.” 
Applying this focus to the Sign Code, we 
found that the ordinance “regulates physical 
characteristics, such as size, number and 
construction of the signs,” their locations, 
and the timing of displays, none of which 
“implicate the content of speech.” We noted 
that “[t]he definition of a Qualifying Event 
sign merely encompasses the elements of 
‘who’ is speaking and ‘what event’ is 
occurring.” These two criteria invoke the 
speaker-based and event-based 
characteristics approved in G.K. 
Ltd. because “the City d[id] not limit the 
substance of [the] speech in any way.” We 
explained that this case: 
highlights the absurdity of construing the 
“officer must read it” test as a bellwether 
of content. If applied without common 
sense, this principle would mean that 
every sign, except a blank sign, would be 
content based. While a Gilbert officer 
needs to briefly take in what is written on 
the Qualifying Event Sign to note who is 
speaking and the timing of the listed 
event, this “kind of cursory examination” 
is not akin to an officer synthesizing the 
expressive content of the sign. 
We concluded “that § 4.402(P) is not a 
content-based regulation: It does not single 
out certain content for differential treatment, 
and in enforcing the provision an officer 
must merely note the content-neutral 
elements of who is speaking through the 
sign and whether and when an event is 
occurring.” 
3. The Sign Code is narrowly tailored to 
further Gilbert's significant interests 
Third, we determined that the Sign Code, 
“as a content-neutral time, place and manner 
regulation,” also had to be, and was, 
narrowly tailored. Quoting Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, we recognized that to be 
“narrowly tailored” the Sign Code had to 
“serve a significant governmental interest” 
and had to “leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of that 
information.” We held that the district court 
had not abused its discretion in concluding 
that the Sign Code “is narrowly tailored as it 
does not sweep in more speech than is 
necessary to achieve the Town's aesthetic 
and traffic objectives,” explaining: 
The restrictions on time, place and 
manner imposed by Gilbert on the 
display of Qualifying Events Signs would 
indeed appear to “actually advance” the 
aesthetic and safety interests by limiting 
the size, duration and proliferation of 
signs. These measures restricting the 
number of signs and limiting them to 
private property do not appear 
substantially broader measures than 
required to make sure the rights-of-way 
are not so thicketed with signs as to pose 
a safety hazard or create an aesthetic 
blight. The limitation on timing—twelve 
hours before the event and one hour 
after—is equally narrowly tailored to 
meet these interests. While it might be 
easier and provide broader exposure for 
Good News to have the sign up for 
twenty-four hours, the test is not 
convenience or optimal display. 
We also held that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding that the Sign 
Code allowed for alternate channels of 
communications for Good News to 
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communicate effectively with members of 
the public. We explained that “[w]hile the 
alternative options identified by the district 
court may not be Good News' preference, 
‘we cannot invalidate the Sign Code merely 
because it restricts plaintiffs' preferred 
method of communication.’ ” We also noted 
that the alternative modes available did not 
appear to be especially burdensome. 
This section of Reed concludes with the 
affirmative statement that: 
Section 4.402(P) is a content-neutral 
regulation of the time, place and manner 
of display of Good News' Qualifying 
Event Signs; the provision is narrowly 
tailored to further Gilbert's significant 
interests in aesthetics and traffic safety; 
and Good News has ample alternative 
channels of communicating its invitation 
to church services. 
4. The Sign Code does not favor 
commercial over noncommercial speech 
The fourth relevant holding in Reed is our 
determination that the district court “did not 
abuse its discretion in concluding, after 
close examination, that the Sign Code does 
not favor commercial speech over non-
commercial speech.” Our opinion in Reed 
remanded on a limited issue only: “to 
consider the First Amendment and Equal 
Protection claims that the Sign Code is 
unconstitutional in favoring some 
noncommercial speech over other 
noncommercial speech.” We noted that 
“[o]n remand, the district court will have the 
opportunity to determine whether Gilbert 
impermissibly ‘evaluate[d] the strength of, 
or distinguished between, various 
[noncommercial] communicative interests.’” 
D. Proceedings on Remand in the District 
Court 
On remand, the parties agreed to submit the 
case on cross-motions for summary 
judgment. The district court's order set forth 
three preliminary determinations. First, 
based in part on our opinion in Reed, the 
court held that the Sign Code “is a content-
neutral regulation of speech that seeks to 
identify who is speaking and what event is 
occurring and does not discriminate on the 
basis of content.” Second, citing its 
preliminary injunction order, the district 
court reiterated that the Sign Code was 
narrowly tailored to serve significant 
government interests. Third, the court 
embraced as a non-preliminary finding its 
determination that noncommercial speech is 
more favorably treated than commercial 
speech. 
Addressing the remanded issue, the district 
court thought that the different treatments of 
various forms of noncommercial speech 
were “akin to the regulation at issue in G.K. 
Ltd.” The district court reasoned: 
Both Political Signs and Qualifying 
Event Signs relate, in substance, to 
events—an election or a specified event 
fitting the definition in the Sign Code. In 
the case of Political Signs, the event is 
of widespread interest and takes place at 
a fixed, regular interval. A Qualified 
Event might take place once, or it might 
take place several times a week, 
depending on the type of event. A 
Qualifying Event Sign could invoke so-
called “core” speech, but Political Signs 
are always core speech.... To distinguish 
between a Political Sign and a 
Qualifying Event Sign, an officer need 
only skim the sign to determine the 
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speaker (e.g. is a non-profit speaking?) 
and the event at issue (e.g. does this 
relate to an election or a Qualifying 
Event?). In G.K. Ltd., the court 
concluded that speaker—and—event 
based exemptions did not render a sign 
regulation content-based because the 
municipality was distinguishing on the 
basis of the speaker's identity and 
whether a triggering event had 
occurred, not on the basis of the sign's 
content. 
.... 
Ideological Signs are not tied to a 
specific event, the way Political and 
Qualifying Event Signs are, so they are 
not subject to an event-based time 
restriction under the Sign Code. This 
accounts for the different “time” 
restriction for Ideological Signs. As for 
place, namely whether a particular type 
of sign can be placed in the right-of-way, 
Gilbert argues that it has made a 
municipal decision to limit the overall 
number of signs in the right-of-way, and 
it does not discriminate at all among 
Ideological Signs.... Nonetheless, the 
Court finds that the Sign Code does not 
distinguish on the basis of the message of 
the sign because, other than signs relating 
to events—whether those events are 
elections or bake sales—the Sign Code 
treats all messages on equal footing. 
Because Ideological Signs do not relate 
to an event, they are distinguishable from 
Qualifying Event Signs. To determine 
whether a sign is an Ideological Sign or a 
Qualifying Event Sign, an officer does 
not need to read the content: he or she 
need only look to see whether the sign 
concerns an event. 
After determining that the Sign Code did not 
discriminate among types of noncommercial 
speech, the district court rejected Good 
News' argument that the Sign Code was 
impermissibly vague and overbroad. 
Citing United States v. Williams, the district 
court commented that the “[v]agueness 
doctrine is an outgrowth not of the First 
Amendment, but of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment,” and that a statute 
is void if it does not “provide a person of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is 
prohibited, or is so standardless that it 
authorizes or encourages seriously 
discriminatory enforcement.” The district 
court determined that the deterrent effect of 
the Sign Code was “insubstantial and 
remote” as the “ordinance provides plenty of 
guidance for people of ordinary intelligence 
to determine what conduct is permitted and 
prohibited, and does not foster arbitrary, 
capricious, or discriminatory enforcement.” 
E. Gilbert's Motion to Dismiss 
Good News filed this appeal from the 
district court's entry of summary judgment 
in favor of Gilbert. However, in October 
2011, while the appeal was pending, Gilbert 
made two amendments to its Sign Code: (1) 
it allowed placement of Temporary 
Directional Signs within the public right-of-
way; and (2) it limited the Temporary 
Directional Sign exemption to events held 
within the Town of Gilbert.
 
Based on the 
amended Sign Code, Gilbert filed a motion 
to dismiss this appeal, arguing that because 
Good News held its services outside of 
Gilbert, it does not qualify for the 
Temporary Directional Sign exemption, and 
lacks standing to pursue this appeal. 
The motion to dismiss presents a situation 
analogous to that before the Supreme Court 
in Northeastern Florida Chapter of 
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Associated General Contractors of America 
v. City of Jacksonville. In Northeastern 
Florida, the plaintiffs challenged a city 
ordinance providing preferential treatment to 
certain minority owned businesses for city 
contracts. The district court granted the 
plaintiffs summary judgment, holding that 
the ordinance was unconstitutional, but the 
Eleventh Circuit vacated that order finding 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Shortly 
after the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
the city repealed the questioned ordinance 
and replaced it with new ordinance that 
provided for a more narrow minority 
preference. The city then filed a motion to 
dismiss the case as moot. 
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, held 
that the case was not moot. He relied on the 
Court's “well settled rule” set forth in City of 
Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. that “a 
defendant's voluntary cessation of a 
challenged practice does not deprive a 
federal court of its power to determine the 
legality of the practice.” Justice Thomas 
wrote: 
There is no mere risk that Jacksonville 
will repeat its allegedly wrongful 
conduct; it has already done so. Nor does 
it matter that the new ordinance differs in 
certain respects from the old one. City of 
Mesquite does not stand for the 
proposition that it is only the possibility 
that the selfsame statute will be enacted 
that prevents a case from being moot; if 
that were the rule, a defendant could 
moot a case by repealing the challenged 
statute and replacing it with one that 
differs only in some insignificant respect. 
The Court concluded that the new ordinance 
disadvantaged plaintiffs “in the same 
fundamental way” and thus the case was not 
moot. Justice O'Connor, while dissenting, 
commented that: 
City of Mesquite stands for the 
proposition that the Court has discretion 
to decide a case in which the statute 
under review has been repealed or 
amended. The Court appropriately may 
render judgment where circumstances 
demonstrate that the legislature likely 
will reinstate the old law—which would 
make a declaratory judgment or an order 
enjoining the law's enforcement 
worthwhile. But such circumstances 
undoubtedly are rare. 
Good News' case is one of those rare cases. 
The amendment of the Sign Code to allow 
directional signs to be placed in the public 
right-of-way moots Good News' objection to 
this provision of the Sign Code, but the new 
restriction, limiting the Temporary 
Directional Signs exemption to events that 
take place in Gilbert, bars Good News from 
erecting any directional signs at all. Thus, a 
dismissal for mootness would allow Gilbert 
to continue to limit Good News' speech 
without further judicial review. Accordingly, 
the motion to dismiss is denied. 
II. 
Reed limits our consideration of Good 
News' challenges to the Sign Code. 
Although our opinion in Reed reviewed the 
denial of a preliminary injunction, our 
determinations included conclusions of law. 
Furthermore, on remand, the parties agreed 
to resolve all remaining issues on cross-
motions for summary judgment. There is no 
indication that the parties engaged in further 
discovery, and Good News has not asserted 
any evidentiary facts in this appeal that were 
not before us in Reed. Thus, our opinion 
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in Reed constitutes law of the case and is 
binding on us. 
Reed establishes first that “§ 4.402(P) is not 
a content-based regulation,” and second that 
the Sign Code generally is a reasonable (i.e., 
not unconstitutional) time, place and manner 
restriction. The single issue remanded, and 
hence the primary substantive issue before 
the district court and now on appeal, is 
whether the Sign Code improperly 
discriminates between different forms of 
noncommerical speech. 
We review de novo the district court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of Gilbert. 
A. The Evolving Standard for Evaluating 
the Regulation of Noncommercial Speech 
Judicial review of the regulation of 
noncommercial speech has evolved over the 
last 30 years. In 1981, Justice White, in his 
plurality opinion in Metromedia stated that 
while a city “may distinguish between the 
relative value of different categories of 
commercial speech, the city does not 
have the same range of choice in the area of 
noncommercial speech to evaluate the 
strength of, or distinguish between, various 
communicative interests.” Seven years later 
in National Advertising Co. v. City of 
Orange, we recognized that an ordinance 
would be invalid if it imposed greater 
restrictions on noncommercial than on 
commercial billboards. We noted that a 
restriction based on content would be 
unconstitutional unless it was narrowly 
drawn to serve a compelling interest, but 
suggested that the city was nonetheless “not 
powerless to regulate billboards containing 
noncommercial messages.” In Desert 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Moreno 
Valley, we indicated that an ordinance 
regulating noncommercial speech would be 
invalid if it imposed greater restrictions on 
noncommercial than commercial billboards 
or if it regulated noncommercial billboards 
“based on their content.” Regarding 
Gilbert's Sign Code, we have already held 
that it does not impose greater restrictions 
on noncommercial signs than commercial 
signs, and thus the critical issue now before 
us is whether the Sign Code improperly 
regulates noncommercial temporary signs 
based on their content. 
The definition of “content neutral” has also 
evolved over the last couple of decades. In 
Foti, relying on Desert Outdoor, we 
indicated that when an officer must examine 
the contents of a sign to determine whether 
an exemption applies, the ordinance is 
content-based. However, we also noted the 
Supreme Court's advice that “laws that by 
their terms distinguish favored speech from 
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas 
or views expressed are content based,” and 
that a “speech restriction is content neutral if 
it is justified without reference to the content 
of the regulated speech.” 
More recently, following these guidelines 
we have fashioned a more nuanced standard. 
In G.K. Ltd., we held that “[n]either the 
speaker- nor event-based exemptions 
implicate Foti insofar as neither requires law 
enforcement officers to read a sign's 
message to determine if the sign is exempted 
from the ordinance.” The standard of review 
set forth is: 
The “government may impose reasonable 
restrictions on the time, place, or manner 
423 
 
of engaging in protected speech provided 
that they are adequately justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated 
speech.” In addition to being justified 
without reference to content, the 
restrictions must be “narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant governmental interest 
and ... leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the 
information.”  
In Reed, applying this standard, we 
concluded that the Sign Code “does not 
single out certain content for differential 
treatment, and in enforcing the provision an 
officer must merely note the content-neutral 
elements of who is speaking through the 
sign and whether and when an event is 
occurring.” Nonetheless, this appeal raises 
two unanswered questions under the G.K. 
Ltd. standard: (1) are the differing 
restrictions between types of noncommercial 
speech “adequately justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated 
speech”; and (2) are they narrowly tailored? 
The first issue is the fulcrum of this appeal. 
B. The Restrictions on Types of 
Noncommercial Speech are not Based on 
the Content of the Speech. 
The thrust of Good News' challenge to the 
Sign Code is that its different restrictions for 
different types of noncommercial speech are 
inherently content-based and thus 
unconstitutional. However, we rejected this 
general argument in Reed when we held that 
distinctions based on the speaker or the 
event are permissible where there is no 
discrimination among similar events or 
speakers. Thus, under Reed, the distinctions 
between Temporary Directional Signs, 
Ideological Signs, and Political Signs are 
content-neutral. That is to say, each 
classification and its restrictions are based 
on objective factors relevant to Gilbert's 
creation of the specific exemption from the 
permit requirement and do not otherwise 
consider the substance of the sign. The 
Political Signs exemption responds to the 
need for communication about 
elections. The Ideological Sign exemption 
recognizes that an individual's right to 
express his or her opinion is at the core of 
the First Amendment. The Temporary 
Directional Sign exemption allows the 
sponsor of an event to put up temporary 
directional signs immediately before the 
event. Each exemption is based on objective 
criteria and none draws distinctions based on 
the particular content of the sign. It makes 
no difference which candidate is supported, 
who sponsors the event, or what ideological 
perspective is asserted. Accordingly, as the 
speaker and event determinations are 
generally “content neutral,” Gilbert's 
different exemptions for different types of 
noncommercial speech are not prohibited by 
the Constitution. 
Our reading of Reed is in accord with our 
opinion in G.K. Ltd. There the town 
ordinance banned most pole signs but had a 
grandfather clause for preexisting signs. We 
determined that “the City's restriction on 
plaintiffs' pole sign is not a content-based 
regulation of plaintiffs' speech.” We 
commented: 
The pole sign restriction is not a “law[ ] 
that by [its] terms distinguish[es] favored 
speech from disfavored speech on the 
basis of the ideas or views expressed.” 
The Code restricts all pole signs across 
the City's general commercial zones 
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without creating exceptions for preferred 
content. The burdens imposed by these 
pole sign restrictions are borne equally by 
all of the City's residents. Further, 
plaintiffs offer no evidence suggesting 
illicit motive or bias on the part of the 
City or that the City banned pole signs in 
general, or their pole sign in particular, 
because of a desire to stifle certain 
viewpoints. 
The plaintiffs in G.K. Ltd. argued that 
ordinance's grandfather clause rendered it 
content-based because town officials would 
have to read the pole sign to see if it had 
changed. We rejected this argument, 
explaining: 
Unlike Foti's exemptions, the grandfather 
clause does not require Lake Oswego 
officials to evaluate the substantive 
message on the preexisting sign and the 
clause certainly does not favor speech 
“based on the idea expressed.” A 
grandfather provision requiring an officer 
to read a sign's message for no other 
purpose than to determine if the text or 
logo has changed, making the sign now 
subject to the City's regulations, is not 
content-based. 
Under the controlling precedent 
of Reed and G.K. Ltd., Good News has not 
shown that the Sign Code imposes a 
content-based limitation. 
C. Supreme Court Precedent Affirms our 
Definition of Content Neutral. 
As suggested in G.K. Ltd., our approach is in 
accord with the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Hill v. Colorado. In Hill, the plaintiffs 
challenged “the constitutionality of a 1993 
Colorado statute that regulates speech-
related conduct within 100 feet of the 
entrance to any health care facility.” In 
holding that the statute was constitutional, 
the Supreme Court commented that it had 
“never held, or suggested, that it is improper 
to look at the content of an oral or written 
statement in order to determine whether a 
rule of law applies to a course of conduct.” 
The Court noted that the statute: 
places no restrictions on—and clearly 
does not prohibit—either a particular 
viewpoint or any subject matter that may 
be discussed by a speaker. Rather, it 
simply establishes a minor place 
restriction on an extremely broad 
category of communications with 
unwilling listeners. Instead of drawing 
distinctions based on the subject that the 
approaching speaker may wish to 
address, the statute applies equally to 
used car salesmen, animal rights activists, 
fundraisers, environmentalists, and 
missionaries. 
Similarly, Gilbert's Sign Code places no 
restrictions on the particular viewpoints of 
any person or entity that seeks to erect a 
Temporary Directional Sign and the 
exemption applies equally to all. 
Furthermore, in Hill, the Supreme Court 
explained why a statute, which only 
restricted certain types of speech-related 
conduct, is properly considered content 
neutral. The Court reiterates that “[t]he 
principal inquiry in determining content 
neutrality, in speech cases generally and in 
time, place, or manner cases in particular, is 
whether the government has adopted a 
regulation of speech because of 
disagreement with the message it 
conveys.” It then offers three reasons for 
why the statute is content neutral: 
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First, it is not a “regulation of speech.” 
Rather, it is a regulation of the places 
where some speech may occur. Second, it 
was not adopted “because of 
disagreement with the message it 
conveys.” ... Third, the State's interests in 
protecting access and privacy, and 
providing the police with clear 
guidelines, are unrelated to the content of 
the demonstrators' speech. As we have 
repeatedly explained, government 
regulation of expressive activity is 
“content neutral” if it is justified without 
reference to the content of regulated 
speech. 
The Court further stated that it had “never 
held, or suggested, that it is improper to 
look at the content of an oral or written 
statement in order to determine whether a 
rule of law applies to a course of 
conduct.” The Supreme Court also 
distinguished its opinion in Carey v. 
Brown, noting that the Colorado statute 
“places no restrictions on—and clearly 
does not prohibit—either a particular 
viewpoint or any subject matter that may 
be discussed by a speaker.” Finally, in 
response to Justice Scalia's concern that 
content-based legislation can be used for 
invidious thought-control purposes, the 
Court stated: “[b]ut a statute that restricts 
certain categories of speech only lends 
itself to invidious use if there is a 
significant number of communications, 
raising the same problem that the statute 
was enacted to solve, that fall outside the 
statute's scope, while others fall inside.” 
Gilbert's regulation of Temporary 
Directional Signs is content-neutral as that 
term is defined by the Supreme Court 
in Hill. Gilbert did not adopt its regulation 
of speech because it disagreed with the 
message conveyed. Rather, it exempted 
from the permit requirement all directional 
signs regardless of their content.
 
The Code is 
“a regulation of the places where some 
speech may occur,” and was not adopted 
“because of any disagreement with the 
message it conveys.” Also, Gilbert's 
interests in regulation temporary signs are 
unrelated to the content of the sign. 
Moreover, there is no danger of the 
regulation being used for invidious thought-
control purposes as the Sign Code does not 
purport to regulate the content of Temporary 
Directional Signs. Because Gilbert's Sign 
Code places no restrictions on the particular 
viewpoints of any person or entity that seeks 
to erect a Temporary Directional Sign and 
the exemption applies to all, it is content-
neutral as that term has been defined by the 
Supreme Court. 
D. Good News has not shown that the 
Sign Code's Different Treatment of 
Different Types of Noncommercial 
Speech is Unconstitutional. 
Although it is conceivable, as the dissent 
posits, that different exemptions for 
noncommercial speech might improperly 
restrict speech, that concern is not presented 
here. First, as explained, the Temporary 
Directional Sign exemption is a content 
neutral. Second, the Temporary Directional 
Sign exemption is not in competition with 
other exemptions from the permit 
requirement. This is not a situation where 
there are a limited number of billboards or 
maximum number of temporary signs that 
may be placed in the public right-of-way. 
Nor does the erection of temporary 
directional signs in any way limit any other 
person's rights to erect political, ideological, 
or other signs. Accordingly, as long as the 
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Temporary Directional Signs exemption—
which is the exemption that was applied to 
Good News' signs and that Good News 
challenges—is content neutral and 
reasonable in relationship to its purpose—
providing direction to temporary events—its 
constitutionality is not affected by the fact 
that the exemptions for Political Signs or 
Ideological Signs are different. 
The cases cited by the dissent do question 
distinctions among different categories of 
non-commercial speech, but none concerned 
instances in which the types of non-
commercial speech were unrelated, and all 
of the cases have been refined by more 
recent Supreme Court opinions. In Police 
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, the 
Supreme Court struck down an ordinance as 
unconstitutional because it sought to 
distinguish between peaceful labor picketing 
and other peaceful picketing. Similarly, 
in Carey, the Supreme Court struck down an 
ordinance that sought to distinguish between 
picketing at a residence from picketing at a 
place of employment. In Metromedia, the 
Court, in a fractured opinion, considered an 
ordinance that differentiated between 
commercial and non-commercial billboards, 
but also suggested that the city had less 
leeway to distinguish between types of non-
commercial speech than between types of 
commercial speech. These cases concerned 
related and competing forms of speech. In 
contrast, Gilbert's Temporary Directional 
Signs exemption neither restricts nor 
competes with a person's or entity's ability to 
take advantage of the exemptions for 
political, ideological, or other types of 
temporary signs. 
Critically, as noted, over the last thirty years, 
the Supreme Court has refined the concerns 
set forth in Justice White's plurality opinion 
in Metromedia. Most notably, in Hill, the 
Supreme Court upheld a statute that clearly 
distinguished between types of 
noncommercial speech. The statute 
prohibited the noncommercial speech of 
“approaching” an individual “for the 
purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, 
displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral 
protest, education or counseling with such 
other person.” No other form of 
noncommercial speech was regulated. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld the 
ordinance. Similarly, in Ward, the Supreme 
Court stated that a “regulation that serves 
purposes unrelated to the content of 
expression is deemed neutral, even if it has 
an incidental effect on some speakers or 
messages but not others.” Thus, the Sign 
Code's different provisions for Political, 
Ideological and Temporary Directional 
Signs is not in itself unconstitutional. 
Although Good News voices some 
objections to the size, location, and duration 
limitations on its signs, Good News does not 
assert that the restrictions actually interfere 
with the purpose of the signs: providing 
directions to Good News' services. 
Moreover, courts have generally deferred to 
municipal decisions concerning the actual 
limitations on the sizes and shapes of signs. 
E. The Temporary Directional Signs 
Exemption is Narrowly Tailored to Serve 
Significant Governmental Interests 
The Supreme Court has explained that 
“[c]ontent-neutral regulations do not pose 
the same inherent dangers to free expression 
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that content-based regulations do, and thus 
are subject to a less rigorous analysis, which 
affords the Government latitude in designing 
a regulatory solution.” Nonetheless, a 
content-neutral, reasonable time, place and 
manner restriction must also be narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest and leave open ample alternative 
channels of communication.  
There is no real question that Gilbert's 
interests in safety and aesthetics are 
significant. Good News argues only that 
such interests are not “sufficiently 
compelling to satisfy a content-based sign 
code,” but we find that the Sign Code does 
not impose any content-based restriction. 
Good News contends that the Sign Code is 
not narrowly tailored because all temporary 
signs placed within the public right-of-way 
implicate safety and aesthetic concerns, but 
Temporary Directional Signs are more 
severely limited than Political and 
Ideological Signs. 
Political and Ideological Signs may infringe 
on Gilbert's interests to a greater extent than 
Temporary Directional Signs, but for a 
number of reasons this is permissible. First, 
unlike political, ideological and religious 
speech which are clearly entitled to First 
Amendment protection, there does not 
appear to be a constitutional right to an 
exemption for Temporary Directional Signs. 
If Good News has no constitutional right to 
erect Temporary Directional Signs, how can 
it suffer a cognizable harm when Gilbert 
creates an exemption facilitating the display 
of such signs? 
Second, each exemption reflects a balance 
between Gilbert's interests and the 
constitutional interests of the type of sign 
covered. With the recent amendment to the 
Sign Code, there are no longer any 
differences as to where temporary signs may 
be located. The differences as to duration are 
based on the natures of the types of speech 
involved. Thus, under Arizona law political 
signs are allowed for an extended period of 
time before an election. Ideological signs, 
not being tied to any event, have no time 
limit. However, the purpose of a Temporary 
Directional Sign inherently contemplates a 
limit on duration. 
Third, as noted, the exemptions are not in 
competition. The exemptions are not 
competing for limited space and the erection 
of one type of temporary sign does not 
preclude the placement of another. 
Accordingly, each exemption may be 
evaluated on its own merits. 
Fourth, there is no showing that the 
restrictions on Temporary Directional Signs 
interfere with their purpose: directing 
interested individuals to temporary events. 
Good News does not allege that the public 
cannot see its signs or that the size limit is 
too small to allow it to adequately provide 
directions. 
Finally, as also noted, courts generally defer 
to a city's determinations of size and 
duration. Here, the restrictions on 
Temporary Directional Signs are reasonable. 
There are no limits on the number of events 
that a person or entity may hold, and no 
limit on the number of signs that may be 
erected (other than no more than four on any 
single piece of property). Also, the 12–hour 
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limitation seems reasonable as a person is 
unlikely to seek directions to an event more 
than 12 hours before the event. 
We conclude that these considerations refute 
Good News' arguments that to be narrowly 
tailored restrictions on types of 
noncommercial speech must be uniform or 
vary only to the extent that the type of 
speech affects a town's interests. Our 
opinions in G.K. Ltd. And Reed support, if 
not compel, our conclusion. In G.K. Ltd., we 
held a total ban on changed pole signs was 
narrowly tailored because pole signs could 
reasonably be perceived as aesthetically 
harmful and distracting to travelers, even 
though this is also true of unchanged pole 
signs. In Reed, we determined that “[t]he 
restrictions on time, place and manner 
imposed by on the display of [signs] would 
indeed appear to ‘actually advance’ the 
aesthetic and safety interests by limiting the 
size duration and proliferation of signs.” Our 
determination in Reed that the Sign Code is 
narrowly tailored, if not controlling, remains 
sound. 
In sum, (a) Gilbert was not required to 
create an exemption for Temporary 
Directional Signs, (b) the restrictions on 
directional signs are rationally related to the 
purpose of the directional signs, and (c) the 
restrictions are reasonably designed to 
promote Gilbert's interests in aesthetics and 
safety. True, the number of temporary signs 
might be substantially reduced if there were 
not exemptions for political and ideological 
signs, but those signs raise different legal 
rights and interests that Gilbert has to 
respect. Moreover, there need only be a 
reasonable fit between the Gilbert's interest 
and the regulations. At least between 
elections, the Sign Code may well limit the 
number of temporary signs in Gilbert 
without unreasonably limiting anyone's 
speech, and thus the Sign Code serves 
significant governmental interests. 
Finally, the Sign Code leaves open ample 
alternate means of communication. 
Assuming that Good News events are 
eligible for the exemption, it may erect as 
many temporary signs as it wants twelve 
hours before each scheduled event. The Sign 
Code does not regulate any of the many 
other ways in which Good News can “go 
and make disciples of all nations.” Indeed, 
there is no suggestion that Good News' 
tenets require that it or its members erect 
temporary directional signs. Thus, the Sign 
Code's restrictions do not require that the 
members of Good News violate any cardinal 
principle of their faith and do not limit the 
many other ways the members may 
advertise their services and attract 
individuals. 
F. Good News' Other Challenges do not 
Merit Relief 
1. To prevail on its claims of violation of its 
members' right to the free exercise of 
religion under the Constitution and under 
Arizona's Free Exercise of Religion Act, 
Good News must show that “the government 
action substantially burdens the exercise of 
religious beliefs.” Good News' free exercise 
claim fails because the Sign Code's 
restrictions on the size and duration of 
Temporary Directional Signs is a generally 
applicable law, and it does not substantially 
interfere with any of Good News' tenets. 
The Supreme Court has held that religion 
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may not exempt a person from complying 
with neutral laws. Furthermore, while Good 
News' members may be obligated to spread 
their message and advertise their events, 
there is no suggestion that Good News' 
tenets require that they do so in any 
particular way. Accordingly, we agree with 
the district court that the Sign Code's 
restrictions on Temporary Directional Signs 
do not constitute a substantial burden on 
Good News' free exercise rights. 
2. We also agree with the district court that 
the Sign Code is not vague or overbroad. 
The Supreme Court noted in Ward, that 
“perfect clarity and precise guidance have 
never been required even of regulations that 
restrict express activity.” Good News' claim 
of vagueness is based on an alleged lack of 
definitions for signs that arguably meet the 
requirements of more than one temporary 
sign exemption. However, Gilbert officials 
claim that they have yet to see such a sign 
and Good News does not argue that its signs 
meet the requirements of more than one 
exemption. In addition, in Reed, we held that 
Good News' mounted only an as-applied 
challenge to the Sign Code. This is law of 
the case, and is not really challenged by 
Good News. 
3. Good News' assertion that the Sign Code 
violates its right to equal protection of law is 
basically a revision of its argument that 
Gilbert cannot treat different types of 
noncommercial speech differently. Clothed 
in the garb of equal protection the argument 
still is not persuasive. The Sign Code does 
not make any distinctions based on religion. 
Rather, the Temporary Directional Signs 
exemption is available to all noncommercial 
entities. Because we conclude that the Sign 
Code is not unconstitutional just because it 
differentiates between types of 
noncommercial signs, Good News' equal 
protection argument depends on it 
establishing a cognizable class of 
noncommercial entities wishing to erect 
temporary directional signs to their events 
whose interests may be compared to some 
other class. Good News has failed to identify 
such entities. 
G. Any Challenge Good News May 
Advance to the Amended Sign Code 
Should Be Initially Litigated in the 
District Court 
Although the amendment to the Sign Code 
does not moot this appeal, we need not, and 
do not, determine the merits of the 
amendment. Unlike the situation before the 
Supreme Court in Northeastern 
Florida, here the amendment arguably 
increases rather than decreases the barriers 
to Good News erecting temporary 
directional signs. Also, unlike the holding 
in Northeastern Florida, we have 
determined that Good News has not shown 
that the other restrictions imposed by the 
Sign Code violate its constitutional rights. 
However, the added restriction to the Sign 
Code—that Temporary Directional Signs are 
only exempt from the permit requirement if 
they concern events that take place within 
the Town of Gilbert—is different in nature 
from the time, place, and manner restrictions 
that Good News previously challenged. 
Moreover, even if we assume that Good 
News will challenge the new restriction, we 
do not know what constitutional and legal 
arguments Good News will present in 
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challenging the restriction, or what defenses 
Gilbert will proffer. Accordingly, any 
challenge Good News may have to the 
amendment limiting the Temporary 
Directional Sign exemption to events in the 
Town of Gilbert should be raised in the first 
instance in the district court. As we affirm 
the district court's grant of summary 
judgment for Gilbert, we leave it to the 
district court to determine whether Good 
News may seek to amend its existing 
complaint or should file a new complaint. 
III 
In Reed, and G.K. Ltd., we held that 
distinctions based on the speaker or the 
event are permissible where there is no 
discrimination among similar events or 
speakers. In Hill, the Supreme Court 
indicated that not all types of 
noncommercial speech need be treated the 
same. Applying this case law to the Town of 
Gilbert's Sign Code's treatment of different 
types of noncommercial speech, we 
conclude that the treatment is content-
neutral. That is to say, each exemption 
allowing for the erection of temporary signs 
and its restrictions are based on objective 
factors relevant to the creation of the 
specific exemption and do not otherwise 
consider the substance of a sign. We further 
conclude that the exemptions are narrowly 
tailored because they serve significant 
governmental interests and leave open 
ample alternative channels of 
communication. We also conclude that the 
Sign Code does not violate Good News' (or 
its members') right to the free exercise of 
religion or right to equal protection of law, 
and is not unconstitutionally vague or 
overbroad. The district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the Town of 
Gilbert is AFFIRMED. 
WATFORD, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
I agree with the majority that the post-
judgment amendments to the Town of 
Gilbert's sign ordinance do not render this 
appeal moot. But I disagree with the 
majority's conclusion that the sign ordinance 
is constitutional. 
When this case first came before us, we 
evaluated § 4.402(P) of Gilbert's sign 
ordinance in isolation. That provision 
specifies the restrictions applicable to 
“temporary directional signs relating to a 
qualifying event,” such as the signs plaintiff 
Good News Community Church seeks to 
display inviting people to attend its Sunday 
morning services.
 
We held that, with respect 
to the temporary directional signs it covers, 
§ 4.402(P) is content-neutral. We reached 
that conclusion because, considered on its 
own, § 4.402(P) “does not single out certain 
content for differential treatment, and in 
enforcing the provision an officer must 
merely note the content-neutral elements of 
who is speaking through the sign and 
whether an event is occurring.” 
What we did not decide in Reed I is whether 
§ 4.402(P) is impermissibly content-based 
when viewed in relation to the other 
provisions of Gilbert's sign ordinance. In 
particular, we noted that the district court 
had not addressed plaintiffs' argument that 
“the ordinance unfairly discriminates among 
forms of noncommercial speech” by 
granting more favorable treatment to signs 
that Gilbert categorizes as “political” and 
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“ideological.” We therefore remanded the 
case for resolution of plaintiffs' “First 
Amendment and Equal Protection claims 
that the Sign Code is unconstitutional in 
favoring some noncommercial speech over 
other noncommercial speech.” 
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause and the First 
Amendment's Free Speech Clause prohibit 
the government from favoring certain 
categories of non-commercial speech over 
others based solely on the content of the 
message being conveyed. When regulating 
speech in a public forum, the government 
may draw distinctions among different 
categories of non-commercial speech only if 
those distinctions are justified by some non-
communicative aspect of the speech 
involved. For example, a State may not 
exempt labor picketing from a general ban 
on picketing in front of homes (enacted to 
protect residential privacy), unless it can 
show that labor picketing is inherently less 
disruptive of residential privacy than 
picketing on other subjects. The reason is 
simple: Within the realm of noncommercial 
speech, the government may not decide that 
speech on certain subjects is more (or less) 
valuable—and therefore more (or less) 
deserving of First Amendment protection—
than speech on other subjects. 
The Supreme Court relied on this general 
principle to strike down a municipal sign 
ordinance in Metromedia. A plurality of the 
Court invalidated San Diego's ordinance 
banning most non-commercial billboards on 
the ground that the ordinance impermissibly 
granted exemptions for billboards bearing 
non-commercial speech on favored subjects, 
such as political campaign messages. The 
plurality held that, although cities “may 
distinguish between the relative value of 
different categories of commercial speech,” 
they do not have the same freedom in the 
realm of non-commercial speech “to 
evaluate the strength of, or distinguish 
between, various communicative interests.” 
San Diego could not identify any non-
communicative aspect of the speech at issue 
to justify the distinctions it had drawn. It 
failed to show, for example, that the non-
commercial billboards it banned had any 
greater effect on the city's asserted interests 
in promoting traffic safety and aesthetics 
than the non-commercial billboards it 
permitted. 
Contrary to the majority's suggestion, Hill v. 
Colorado did not modify or refine the core 
principle underlying Mosley, Carey, 
and Metromedia. The statute at issue 
in Hill prohibited, within certain designated 
areas, approaching within eight feet of 
another for the purpose of engaging in oral 
protest, education, or counseling. The Court 
held that the statute was content-neutral 
because it regulated a particular mode of 
communication—approaching within eight 
feet of another to engage in oral protest, 
education, or counseling—without regard to 
the subject of the speaker's message. As the 
Court stressed, “Instead of drawing 
distinctions based on the subject that the 
approaching speaker may wish to address, 
the statute applies equally to used car 
salesmen, animal rights activists, 
fundraisers, environmentalists, and 
missionaries.” Thus, rather than 
distinguishing among different categories of 
non-commercial speech based on the 
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message being conveyed, the Colorado 
statute prohibited all non-commercial 
speech expressed through a particular mode 
of communication—a fact that 
rendered Carey “easily distinguishable.” 
Gilbert's sign ordinance violates the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments by drawing 
content-based distinctions among different 
categories of non-commercial speech. The 
most glaring illustration is the ordinance's 
favorable treatment of “political” and 
“ideological” signs relative to the treatment 
accorded the non-commercial signs 
plaintiffs seek to display. Under the 
ordinance, plaintiffs' temporary directional 
signs may not exceed six square feet in size 
and may not be displayed more than 12 
hours before or one hour after the relevant 
event—here, Sunday morning church 
services. (Given the 9:00 a.m. start time of 
Good News's church services, this 
durational restriction limits the display of 
plaintiffs' signs to periods when it is 
virtually always dark.) In contrast, 
“political” signs—defined as “[a] temporary 
sign which supports candidates for office or 
urges action on any other matter on the 
ballot of primary, general and special 
elections relating to any national, state or 
local election”—may be up to 32 square feet 
in size and may be displayed any time prior 
to an election and removed within 10 days 
after the election. “Ideological” signs—
defined as “a sign communicating a message 
or ideas for non-commercial purposes” that 
is not a construction, directional, political, or 
garage sale sign—may be up to 20 square 
feet in size and are not subject to any 
durational limits at all. 
Gilbert's sign ordinance plainly favors 
certain categories of non-commercial speech 
(political and ideological signs) over others 
(signs promoting events sponsored by non-
profit organizations) based solely on the 
content of the message being conveyed. 
These are not content-neutral “speaker” and 
“event” based distinctions, like those we 
approved in G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake 
Oswego and in Reed I when we reviewed § 
4.402(P) standing alone. Determining 
whether a particular sign will be regulated as 
a “political” sign as opposed to an 
“ideological” sign or a “temporary 
directional sign relating to a qualifying 
event” turns entirely on the content of the 
message displayed on the sign.  
The content-based distinctions Gilbert has 
drawn are impermissible unless it can 
identify some non-communicative aspect of 
the signs at issue to justify this differential 
treatment. Gilbert has merely offered, as 
support for the sign ordinance as a whole, its 
interest in enhancing traffic safety and 
aesthetics. Traffic safety and aesthetics are 
certainly important interests. But to sustain 
the distinctions it has drawn, Gilbert must 
explain why (for example) a 20–square–foot 
sign displayed indefinitely at a particular 
location poses an acceptable threat to traffic 
safety and aesthetics if it bears an 
ideological message, but would pose an 
unacceptable threat if the sign's message 
instead invited people to attend Sunday 
church services. 
Gilbert has not offered any such 
explanation, and I doubt it could come up 
with one if it tried. What we are left with, 
then, is Gilbert's apparent determination that 
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“ideological” and “political” speech is 
categorically more valuable, and therefore 
entitled to greater protection from 
regulation, than speech promoting events 
sponsored by non-profit organizations. That 
is precisely the value judgment that the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments forbid Gilbert 
to make. 
Nothing we said in Reed I is inconsistent 
with this conclusion. There we held only 
that § 4.402(P), viewed in isolation, is a 
valid content-neutral time, place, and 
manner regulation. We did not decide, and 
instead remanded for the district court to 
decide, whether Gilbert's sign ordinance 
draws content-based distinctions by 
“favoring some noncommercial speech over 
other noncommercial speech.” In doing so, 
we mentioned as potentially 
relevant National Advertising Co. v. City of 
Orange where (we noted in Reed I) we 
invalidated a municipal sign ordinance that 
“made content-based distinctions among 
categories of noncommercial speech.” Thus, 
when we said in Reed I that § 
4.402(P) “does not single out certain content 
for differential treatment,” we obviously did 
not decide whether the sign ordinance as a 
whole singles out certain content for 
differential treatment. Otherwise, our 
remand to the district court would have been 
entirely unnecessary. 
For the reasons given above, I would hold 
that the regulatory distinctions Gilbert has 
drawn among different categories of non-
commercial speech are unconstitutional, and 
I would remand for the district court to 
determine whether those provisions of 
Gilbert's sign ordinance are severable. I 
respectfully dissent from the majority's 
contrary holding. 
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“U.S. Supreme Court Will Hear Arizona Church-Sign Case” 
USA Today 
Parker Leavitt 
July 2, 2014 
 
A prolonged legal battle between Gilbert, 
Ariz., and a small Presbyterian church over 
religious signs is headed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, with oral arguments likely 
to start later this year. 
The court on Tuesday announced that it 
would hear Reed v. Town of Gilbert, which 
alleges the town's sign code is 
discriminatory in preventing Good News 
Presbyterian Church from posting roadside 
signs the day before worship services. 
Gilbert officials have argued — and courts 
have agreed — that the rules treat churches 
no differently than other non-commercial 
groups and that the signs are not regulated 
based on who posts them. 
A three-member panel for the 9th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals last year sided with 
Gilbert, although the decision was not 
unanimous and one dissenting judge argued 
that the town's law is unconstitutional. 
Gilbert's code prohibits non-commercial 
event signs, including the church signs 
advertising worship services, from going up 
more than 12 hours beforehand in public 
rights-of-way. 
In contrast, political signs can be placed 60 
days before an election. Ideological signs, 
which are meant to convey a non-
commercial message or idea, can be posted 
in any zoning district and left up 
indefinitely. This could be a message touting 
world peace, for example. 
Alliance Defending Freedom, representing 
Good News pastor Clyde Reed, last year 
asked the Supreme Court to clarify how 
judges should determine whether an 
ordinance discriminates based on content, 
citing disagreement among circuit courts on 
the issue. 
The notion of content-neutral law could 
apply to a wide range of issues, including 
public events, for example. A law forbidding 
all parades down Main Street would be 
neutral, while a law that bans an 
immigration rally would not. 
The Supreme Court typically grants 70 to 80 
— or about 1% — of the 8,000 or so 
petitions it receives each year, Arizona State 
University law professor Paul Bender said. 
Since the Gilbert case appears to involve a 
conflict among circuit courts, it's not 
surprising the Supreme Court agreed to take 
it on, Bender said. 
"This is not a frivolous petition," Bender 
said. "It's a really important question that 
determines a lot of First Amendment cases." 
The U.S. Supreme Court typically weighs in 
on issues with implications beyond an 
individual case, and the Gilbert dispute 
appears to fit that profile. At least four of the 
nine Supreme Court justices must agree to 
accept a petition before the court will hear a 
case. 
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Matt Sharp, legal counsel for Alliance 
Defending Freedom, cheered the court's 
decision to hear the case, saying it had been 
in limbo for months. 
"I think this court has shown a strong desire 
to clarify these important issues regarding 
First Amendment rights," Sharp said. 
Alliance Defending Freedom, based in 
Scottsdale, Ariz., is a conservative 
organization launched in 1994. It litigates 
cases tied to religion, abortion and gay 
marriage. The group claims more than three 
dozen U.S. Supreme Court victories. 
Good News Presbyterian Church's 
congregation consists of a few dozen 
members who meet weekly at a Gilbert 
senior-living center. 
Gilbert's dispute with the church began in 
2005, when the town's code-compliance 
department cited the church for posting 
signs too early in the public right of way. 
The church responded by reducing the 
number of signs and the amount of time they 
were out, but Gilbert notified church 
officials again in 2007 that they were in 
violation. 
Good News filed a lawsuit in March 2007 
alleging that the code regulating signs 
discriminated against religious groups by 
violating free-speech rights. 
Gilbert suspended the code while the case 
made its way through court, but that 
changed in 2008, when Gilbert adopted a 
sign-code amendment. 
The changes allowed churches and other 
groups to post bigger signs, no limit on the 
number of signs and more time for them to 
be up. Town officials also lumped 
charitable, community-service, educational 
and other non-profits into the same category 
as churches for restrictions. 
Gilbert Town Attorney Michael Hamblin 
said courts have rejected Alliance Defending 
Freedom's claims four times and the town 
believes the Supreme Court will do the 
same. 
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“Reed v. Town of Gilbert: an Important First Amendment Content 
Discrimination Case, to be Heard by the Court this Coming Year” 
The Washington Post 
Eugene Volokh 
July 7, 2014 
 
Last week, the Court agreed to hear Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, an important case on the 
distinction between content-based and 
content-neutral restrictions. When the 
government is acting as sovereign — 
imposing rules for all of us, rather than just 
for its own property or its employees — it 
generally has very limited power to impose 
content-based speech restrictions. There are 
some historically recognized First 
Amendment exceptions (e.g., libel, 
incitement, obscenity, and the like) that 
allow certain kinds of content-based 
restrictions, but outside such zones, content-
based restrictions are almost never allowed. 
In theory, the restrictions are upheld only if 
they are “narrowly tailored” to a 
“compelling government interest.” In 
practice, the restrictions are upheld almost 
never. But content-neutral restrictions, such 
as limits on all speech amplification louder 
than a certain volume, limits on the time and 
place of parades or demonstrations, and the 
like, are often upheld — not always, but 
often. Viewpoint-neutral but content-based 
restrictions, such as bans on display of nude 
scenes on drive-in theater screens visible 
from the road, bans on profanity in public 
places, and the like are treated the same as 
content-based restrictions (again, when the 
government is acting as sovereign). 
This makes it particularly important to 
clearly define the line between content-
based and content-neutral restrictions. Reed 
v. Town of Gilbert should give us some 
more clarity on the subject. The UCLA First 
Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic, which I 
run, filed an amicus brief urging the Court to 
support the case; the brief was on behalf of 
Profs. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Eric Freedman, 
Richard Garnett, Seth Kreimer, Nadine 
Strossen, William Van Alstyne, and James 
Weinstein, and my students Curtis Brown, 
Tess Curet, and Ali Vaqar worked on the 
brief. Here is the text, which should also 
give you an idea of the issue and the main 
arguments, though you can also read the 
Ninth Circuit decision (and especially the 
excellent dissent, by Judge Paul Watford, for 
whom I have great respect). 
* * * 
Summary of Argument 
The speech restriction in this case, which 
distinguishes (1) signs “support[ing] 
candidates” or relating to “any other matter 
on the ballot,” (2) “sign[s] communicating a 
message or ideas,” and (3) signs related to 
noncommercial “event[s],” is facially 
content-based. It may well not turn on the 
viewpoint of speech, or be motivated by 
legislative disagreement with certain ideas. 
Yet many precedents from this Court have 
made clear that such content classifications 
make a law content-based, even in the 
absence of improper legislative motive. 
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Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit panel 
majority in this case treated this content-
based law as content-neutral, and in the 
process exacerbated a three-way split among 
eight circuits. Some circuit court decisions, 
including the decision below, seem to be 
focusing on occasional remarks in this 
Court’s cases about the importance of 
whether speech was restricted because of 
legislative hostility to its message. But those 
decisions are ignoring the many precedents 
from this Court striking down content-based 
laws regardless of the absence of any such 
hostility. This Court ought to grant certiorari 
to resolve this split, and to reaffirm the 
importance of treating content-based speech 
restrictions as presumptively 
unconstitutional. 
Argument 
This should have been an easy case. The 
Town’s sign code facially discriminates 
based on the content of signs, expressly 
distinguishing 
1. “temporary sign[s] which support[] 
candidates for office or urge[s] 
action on any other matter on the 
ballot,” which can be up to 32 square 
feet in size, 
2. “sign[s] communicating a message 
or ideas for noncommercial 
purposes” that are not related to a 
“qualifying event,” which can be up 
to 20 square feet in size, and 
3. noncommercial signs that do relate 
to a “qualifying event,” which can 
only be up to 6 square feet in size. 
Under this Court’s precedents, the law is 
therefore content-based. Yet the Ninth 
Circuit panel majority concluded the law 
was content-neutral—and the three-way, 
eight-circuit split identified by the petition 
has led many other courts to make similar 
errors. 
The panel majority’s reasoning apparently 
rested on the conclusions that the Town was 
not motivated by a desire “to suppress 
certain ideas,” by “disagreement with the 
message [the speech] conveys,” or by any 
other “illicit motive,” and that the law 
was viewpoint-neutral. Yet this Court has 
repeatedly made clear that laws 
distinguishing speech based on content—
specifically including laws distinguishing 
campaign-related speech from other 
speech—are content-based even if they are 
viewpoint-neutral and not prompted by any 
motive to suppress particular ideas. 
Thus, for example, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elec. 
Comm’n, this Court held that a law requiring 
campaign literature to be signed was 
content-based. Part of the reason was that 
“the category of covered documents is 
defined by their content—only those 
publications containing speech designed to 
influence the voters in an election need bear 
the required markings.” This was so “even 
though [the] provision applie[d] 
evenhandedly to advocates of differing 
viewpoints.” And because of this content 
discrimination, the law was subject not to 
intermediate scrutiny, but to “exacting 
scrutiny.” Likewise, in this case the category 
of specially treated signs “is defined by their 
content”—“only those [signs] containing 
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speech designed to influence the voters in an 
election” may be over 20 square feet in area. 
Similarly, in Burson v. Freeman, this Court 
treated a restriction on electioneering within 
100 feet of a polling place as content-based: 
“Whether individuals may exercise 
their free speech rights near polling 
places depends entirely on whether 
their speech is related to a political 
campaign. This Court has held that 
the First Amendment’s hostility to 
content-based regulation extends not 
only to a restriction on a particular 
viewpoint, but also to a prohibition 
of public discussion of an entire 
topic.” 
Likewise, in this case, “whether individuals 
may exercise their free speech rights [using 
large signs] depends entirely on whether 
their speech is related to a political 
campaign,” and “whether individuals may 
exercise their free speech rights [using 
medium-sized signs] depends entirely on 
whether their speech is related to [a specific 
event].” Yet “the First Amendment’s 
hostility to content-based regulation extends 
[beyond] restriction[s] on a particular 
viewpoint,” and includes regulation based 
on whether speech relates to an election, to 
ideology generally, or to a “qualifying 
event.” 
Similarly, Consolidated Edison Co. of 
N.Y. v. Public Service Comm’n of N.Y. 
and Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n made clear that an 
exclusion of all political advertising from a 
city-owned bus system was content-based. 
This Court had upheld such an exclusion in 
Lehman v. Shaker Heights based on the 
city’s power as a proprietor of a nonpublic 
forum. But Consolidated Edison and Perry 
make clear that the exclusion was upheld in 
spite of being content-based, solely because 
of this extra government power over 
nonpublic fora (a power that is not 
implicated in this case). 
To be sure, the restrictions 
in McIntyre, Burson, and Lehman treated 
election-related speech or political speech 
worse than speech with other content, and 
the restriction in Reed treats election-related 
speech better. But the analytical question 
whether the restriction is content-based must 
be the same whether the restriction favors a 
category of speech or disfavors it. 
This Court has likewise treated as content-
based many other restrictions that seem 
highly unlikely to have been motivated by a 
desire to suppress particular ideas. For 
example, in Regan v. Time, Inc., this Court 
struck down a statutory provision that 
limited photographic reproductions of 
United States currency, but exempted 
reproductions “for philatelic, numismatic, 
educational, historical, or newsworthy 
purposes to content that was educational or 
newsworthy.” This Court held that the law 
was content-based, because “[a] 
determination concerning the 
newsworthiness or educational value of a 
photograph cannot help but be based on the 
content of the photograph and the message it 
delivers.” 
The statutory exemption was likely not 
prompted by hostility to any particular 
views, or even to any particular subjects. 
Yet this Court treated the law as content-
based. Likewise, just as in Regan v. Time, 
Inc., the determination of whether a sign in 
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Gilbert can be up to 30 square feet or at 
most 24 or even just 6 square feet “cannot 
help but be based on the content” of the 
message the sign delivers. 
Even where signs concern commercial 
speech, this Court has struck down speech 
restrictions that discriminate based on the 
content of the sign. In City of Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network, the government, 
motivated by safety and aesthetic concerns, 
barred the distribution of commercial 
publications through freestanding newsracks 
on public sidewalks. In striking down this 
ordinance, this Court noted that there was no 
evidence that the city acted with any animus 
toward the ideas in respondents’ 
publications. But the decision nonetheless 
rejected the view that “discriminatory 
treatment is suspect under the First 
Amendment only when the legislature 
intends to suppress certain ideas.” 
As in Discovery Network, the town of 
Gilbert might not have had illicit motives in 
enacting the Sign Ordinance. But that should 
be just as irrelevant here as in that case. And 
if the regulation in Discovery Network was 
content-based even as to commercial speech, 
surely Gilbert’s Sign Code must be content-
based when it discriminates based on 
content among noncommercial speech. 
Similarly, in Arkansas Writers’ Project, 
Inc. v. Ragland, this Court struck down as 
unconstitutionally content-based a state sales 
tax exemption for “religious, professional, 
trade, and sports journals.” There was no 
evidence of any improper censorial motive. 
Still, this Court held that, because Arkansas 
“enforcement authorities must necessarily 
examine the content of the message that is 
conveyed” to determine a magazine’s tax 
status, the basis on which Arkansas 
differentiates between magazines is 
“particularly repugnant to First Amendment 
principles.” 
To give just two more examples, in Police 
Department of Chicago v. Mosley 
and Carey v. Brown, this Court viewed as 
content-based restrictions that banned all 
picketing in certain places (near schools and 
residences, respectively), but exempted 
labor picketing. Those restrictions were 
doubtless not motivated by hostility to all 
non-labor-picketing views. Nonetheless, 
because they distinguished speech based on 
content, they were treated as content-based. 
To be sure, this Court has at times treated as 
content-neutral laws that are seen as 
focusing on the “secondary effects” of 
speech. But political signs, ideological signs, 
and event signs are no different in any of 
their possible “secondary effects.” 
In this respect, this case is just 
like Discovery Network (though involving 
fully protected speech, not just commercial 
speech). In Discovery Network, this Court 
noted that, “[i]n contrast to the speech at 
issue in [City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc.], there are no secondary 
effects attributable to respondent publishers’ 
newsracks that distinguish them from the 
newsracks Cincinnati permits to remain on 
its sidewalks.” Likewise, there are no 
secondary effects attributable to Reed’s 
signs promoting religious events that 
distinguish them from the political signs that 
the Town of Gilbert allows to be much 
larger. 
440 
 
The distinction between content-based and 
content-neutral restrictions has emerged as 
one of the most important rules of First 
Amendment law. And this Court has 
repeatedly stressed to lower courts the 
significance of this distinction. 
Yet the decision below, alongside many 
other circuit court opinions, calls content-
neutral that which is indubitably content-
based. Those circuit courts have picked up 
on some remarks in this Court’s 
jurisprudence that might seem to call for an 
inquiry into legislative motivation. But those 
courts have failed to apply the many 
precedents from this Court cited above, 
precedents that Hill and Ward were 
obviously not seeking to overturn. This 
Court should grant certiorari in this case, to 
clarify the content discrimination standard 
both for sign cases and for free speech cases 
more broadly. 
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“Born (Again) Under a Bad Sign:  Ninth Circuit Upholds Ordinance 
Restricting Duration, Location, Quantity, and Size of Directional Signs for 
Church Services” 
Abbott & Kindermann Land Use Law Blog 
William W. Abbott 
February 21, 2013 
 
As part of its overall regulatory code, the 
City of Gilbert, Arizona enacted various 
sign regulations. The regulations generally 
require a City issued sign permit unless the 
sign qualifies under one of nineteen different 
exceptions. Three of the nineteen exceptions 
involved (1) temporary directional signs for 
a qualifying event, (2) political signs and (3) 
ideological signs. Temporary directional 
signs subject to the exemption were subject 
to specific limitations not applicable to 
political and ideological signs including 
size, location (excluded from public right of 
way), and duration (same day only). 
Pastor Reed and Good News Community 
Church (“Good News”) initially filed suit 
challenging the limitations on the temporary 
directional signs, signs which the church 
relied upon for communication with its 
congregation and to the community. In 
response to Good News’ request for a 
preliminary injunction, the district court 
determined that this lawsuit was an “as 
applied” challenge (as applied to Good 
News as compared to a facial challenge to 
the ordinance.) Next, in the initial round of 
litigation, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals concluded that the ordinance was 
not a content based regulation, and that it 
was appropriately narrowly tailored in 
limiting speech. The appellate court also 
upheld the district court’s determination that 
the church had alternate means of 
communications. Finally, and again in the 
context of review the denial of the 
preliminary injunction request by the district 
court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
district court did not error when it concluded 
that the ordinance did not favor commercial 
over non-commercial speech. The matter 
was remanded to the district court to address 
equal protection and First Amendment 
Claims where, by stipulation, the matter was 
submitted based upon cross motions for 
summary judgment. The district court 
entered judgment in favor of the City of 
Gilbert. Following Good News’ second 
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the City 
amended its sign ordinance, then moved to 
dismiss the appeal on the grounds of 
mootness. One element of the amendment 
restricted the use of directional signs only 
for events taking place within City limits, an 
amendment which would have had the effect 
of prohibiting Good News from placing 
signs as church services occurred outside 
city limits. While the amendments 
potentially resolved some of Good News 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the motion 
to dismiss, exercising its discretion to 
review the local regulations. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted the 
somewhat narrow and unusual posture of the 
case. Upon remand, there had been no 
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further discovery, and no suggestion that an 
additional evidentiary proceeding was 
necessary. Accordingly, the justices viewed 
the legal conclusions from the earlier 
decision as the “law of the case”, framing in 
part the review of the appeal of the final 
judgment in favor of the City. The following 
unresolved questions on appeal involved: (1) 
were the different restrictions applicable to 
different types of commercial speech 
justified without reference to the content of 
the speech; and (2) are the differences 
narrowly tailored. Although the exercise of 
segregating sign types between directional, 
political and ideological involved some 
review of sign content, drawing such 
distinctions between general categories was 
acceptable in circumstances in which the 
ordinance was neutral as to signs within a 
particular category. Each exemption was 
based upon objective criteria and no 
distinction was based upon the individual 
sign content. The Court then focused on 
whether the ordinance was “narrowly 
tailored” to serve a legitimate government 
interest. There was no dispute that the City’s 
interests in aesthetics and safety were 
significant. The Court went on to note that 
the same constitutional considerations in 
protecting political, religious and ideological 
speech did not apply to temporary 
directional signs, the effect of which was to 
subject an ordinance creating an exemption 
for directional signs to less judicial scrutiny 
as compared to more protected speech. On 
the evidence before the Court, the Court 
concluded that the regulations of temporary 
directional signs were reasonable. Turning 
to protections under Arizona’s freedom of 
religion statute, the Court also upheld the 
ordinance and regulations as it was neutral 
in character and was not a “substantial 
burden.” Good News’ challenge based upon 
vagueness of the ordinance was rejected in 
part on the basis that the law of the case 
restricted the plaintiff’s claims to “as 
applied” challenges. The Court also 
disposed of Good News’ equal protection 
claims on the same grounds as the plaintiff’s 
primary claims were resolved. As to the 
potential claims to the amended ordinance, 
the Ninth Circuit remanded those potential 
arguments to the district court. 
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NEW TOPIC: HOBBY LOBBY FOLLOW-UP 
“What the Hobby Lobby Ruling Means for America” 
New York Times 
Binyamin Appelbaum 
July 22, 2014 
Last month, as you’ve probably heard, a 
closely divided Supreme Court ruled that 
corporations with religious owners cannot 
be required to pay for insurance coverage of 
contraception. The so-called Hobby Lobby 
decision, named for the chain of craft stores 
that brought the case, has been both praised 
and condemned for expanding religious 
rights and constraining Obamacare. But 
beneath the political implications, the ruling 
has significant economic undertones. It 
expands the right of corporations to be 
treated like people, part of a trend that may 
be contributing to the rise of economic 
inequality. 
The notion that corporations are people is 
ridiculous on its face, but often true. 
Although Mitt Romney was mocked for 
saying it on the campaign trail a few 
summers ago, the U.S. Code, our national 
rule book, defines corporations as people in 
its very first sentence. And since the 19th 
century, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
corporations are entitled to a wide range of 
constitutional protections. This was a 
business decision, and it was a good one. 
Incorporation encourages risk-taking: 
Investors are far more likely to put money 
into a business that can outlast its creators; 
managers, for their part, are more likely to 
take risks themselves because they owe 
nothing to the investors if they fail. 
The rise of corporations, which developed 
more fully in the United States than in other 
industrializing nations, helped to make it the 
richest nation on earth. And economic 
historians have found that states where 
businesses could incorporate more easily 
tended to grow more quickly, aiding New 
York’s rise as a banking center and helping 
Pennsylvania’s coal industry to outstrip 
Virginia’s. The notion of corporate 
personhood still sounds weird, but we rely 
upon it constantly in our everyday lives. The 
corporation that published this column, for 
instance, is exercising its constitutional right 
to speak freely and to make contracts, taking 
money from some of you and giving a little 
to me. 
Since the 1950s, however, the treatment of 
corporations as people has expanded beyond 
its original economic logic. According to 
Naomi Lamoreaux, a professor of 
economics and history at Yale University, 
the success of incorporation led states to 
broaden eligibility to advocacy groups, like 
the N.A.A.C.P. and the Congress of Racial 
Equality, which then became “the first 
corporations to convince the Court that they 
deserved a broader set of rights.” Ever since, 
the court has intermittently extended the 
logic of those rulings, and in 2010 it ruled 
that an advocacy group called Citizens 
United had the right to spend money on 
political advertising — and that every other 
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corporation did, too. Last month, it added 
religious rights to the mix. 
The basic justification is that corporations, 
owned by people, should have the same 
freedoms as people. And in many ways, of 
course, they already do. Chick-fil-A does 
not sell sandwiches on Sundays. Interstate 
Batteries tells prospective employees, 
“While it is not necessary to be a Christian 
to be employed, it is a part of the daily work 
life for Interstate team members.” In 1999, 
Omni Hotels said its new owner, a Christian, 
had made a “moral decision” to stop selling 
pay-per-view pornography. 
But corporations, as F. Scott Fitzgerald 
might have put it, are not like you and me. 
Those special legal powers, which allow 
them to play a valuable role in the economy, 
can also give them the financial power to tilt 
the rules of the game by lobbying for 
particular legislation, among other things. 
“Those properties, so beneficial in the 
economic sphere, pose special dangers in the 
political sphere,” Justice William Rehnquist 
wrote in a dissenting opinion from a 1978 
ruling that is a precursor to Citizens United. 
“Indeed, the States might reasonably fear 
that the corporation would use its economic 
power to obtain further benefits beyond 
those already bestowed.” 
The danger is not only that corporations can 
act at the expense of society, but also that 
the people who control them can act at the 
expense of their own shareholders, 
employees and customers. While the Hobby 
Lobby decision ostensibly addresses only a 
narrow set of circumstances — a corporation 
with relatively few owners, a religious 
objection to particular kinds of birth control 
— these sorts of limited rulings have a 
history of becoming more broadly cited as 
precedent over time. Also, the logic of this 
particular decision was so expansive and 
open-ended. “A corporation is simply a form 
of organization used by human beings to 
achieve desired ends,” Justice Samuel Alito 
wrote. “When rights, whether constitutional 
or statutory, are extended to corporations, 
the purpose is to protect the rights of these 
people.” Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
argued in her dissenting opinion that a 
corporation might object on religious 
grounds to paying for blood transfusions, 
vaccinations or antidepressants. Other 
scholars say the same logic could justify a 
right to privacy as a shield against 
regulatory scrutiny, or a right to bear arms. 
Minority shareholders have little power to 
influence the choices that corporations 
make. Benjamin I. Sachs, a law professor at 
Harvard University, notes that while federal 
law lets union members prevent the use of 
their dues for political purposes, 
shareholders do not have similar rights. “If 
we’re going to say that collectives have 
speech rights, then we should treat unions 
and corporations the same,” Sachs told me. 
Employees are even more vulnerable. When 
companies like YUM! Brands, which owns 
KFC and Taco Bell, campaign against 
minimum-wage increases, they are 
effectively using the profits generated by 
their employees to limit the compensation of 
those same employees. And of course, some 
of Hobby Lobby’s 13,000 workers will now 
need to pay for contraception. 
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Shareholders can sell their shares, sure, and 
employees can find new jobs. But every 
increase in corporate rights is a potential 
limitation on the menu of available jobs and 
investments. “The idea that if you don’t like 
what the corporation is doing you should 
sell your stock, or find a different job, has a 
certain amount of appeal,” said Darrell A.H. 
Miller, a professor of law at Duke 
University. “But it also assumes that people 
are able to just fish and cut bait. Capital is 
easier to move around than your body and 
your family.” 
If the court follows the logic of its Hobby 
Lobby decision in the decades to come, it’s 
not so hard to imagine a job market where 
people must interview employers about their 
religious and political views. Or where 
people who need to make a living may just 
feel compelled to accept a work 
environment increasingly shaped by their 
employers’ beliefs. 
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“Fault Lines Re-Emerge in U.S. Supreme Court at End of Term” 
Reuters 
Joan Biskupic 
June 30, 2014 
Sometimes there is no middle ground. 
Through much of the U.S. Supreme Court's 
term, the nine justices found common if 
narrow ground to bridge their differences. 
Many of their high-profile decisions avoided 
the polarization that defines Washington 
today. That all changed on Monday, the last 
day of the nine-month term, with the re-
emergence of a familiar 5-4 fault line in a 
dispute over a U.S. law requiring employers 
to provide insurance for contraceptives. 
For 30 minutes Justice Samuel Alito, a 
conservative who wrote the majority 
opinion, and liberal Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, who wrote the lead dissent, 
voiced their competing views of the 
meaning for America of the decision 
permitting some corporate employers to 
object on religious grounds to certain kinds 
of birth control. 
In recent weeks the justices had resolved an 
array of disputes, including over abortion 
protests and presidential appointment power, 
police searches of cellphones and 
environmental regulation, as well as rules 
for class-action lawsuits. 
In all of those, the nine managed to find 
shared terrain, even some unanimity. In the 
cases over abortion protests and presidential 
“recess” appointments, the justices ruled 9-0 
on the bottom line, even as four justices 
broke away each time to protest the 
majority’s legal reasoning. 
But religion is different. The justices divide 
bitterly over it. Monday's case was further 
clouded by the issue of reproductive rights 
and the assertion by the family-owned 
companies in the dispute that some 
contraceptive drugs and devices are akin to 
abortion. 
In the case of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, the companies challenged the 
Obamacare insurance requirement for 
employee birth control. They objected to 
four methods, including the so-called 
morning-after pill. They said they should 
qualify for an exemption under a 1993 
religious freedom law. The Obama 
administration countered that for-profit 
corporations, even closely held ones, are not 
covered by the 1993 law. 
In his opinion for the court's five 
conservatives, Alito said there was a federal 
interest in ensuring that people who run 
their businesses for profit not compromise 
their religious beliefs. “A corporation is 
simply a form of organisation used by 
human beings to achieve desired ends,” he 
said. He asserted the decision would have 
limited effect. 
Alito said Congress did not want to exclude 
people who operate for-profit businesses 
from the law's protections. Ginsburg 
countered that such a view effectively 
allows religious owners to impose their 
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views on employees who might not share 
their belief. 
"STARTLING BREADTH" 
In her dissent representing the four liberals, 
Ginsburg called the ruling one of “startling 
breadth.” A women’s rights advocate in the 
1970s, she recalled how the court had long 
declared contraceptive coverage crucial to 
women’s participation in the economic life 
of the country. 
The last announced opinion of the term, 
Monday's case was arguably the most high-
profile. It forced the justices to confront 
difficult issues against the backdrop of the 
enduringly controversial 2010 
signature healthcare law of Democratic 
President Barack Obama. 
The term featured none of the blockbuster 
decisions of the past two years when the 
court upheld the Obamacare law and set the 
pace for same-sex marriage and voting 
rights. All told, this term's cases failed to 
capture public attention the same way. The 
rulings gave each side - left and right - 
something to call a triumph. 
The justices also ruled narrowly, and even 
unanimously, in some major business cases, 
including one brought by Halliburton testing 
how easily shareholders can band together in 
class-action lawsuits for damages. 
When the court separately ruled that the 
streaming video service Aereo Inc had 
violated copyright law, the majority stressed 
the decision was limited and did not cover 
other technologies such as cloud computing. 
In politically gridlocked Washington, the 
justices, particularly Chief Justice John 
Roberts, could be feeling institutional 
pressure to come together rather than pull 
apart, Harvard law professor Richard Fallon 
said. 
“We have this enormous gap in politics 
today, between liberals and conservatives,” 
Fallon said. “The chief justice may be 
naturally concerned that people not look at 
the Supreme Court and see it divided in this 
same way.” 
But the justices found themselves more apart 
than together on Monday. Sitting alongside 
each other on the long mahogany bench, 
Alito and Ginsburg barely looked at each 
other while reading from their opinions. 
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“After Hobby Lobby, Business Revives Contraception Fight” 
Law 360 
Kelly Knaub 
July 30, 2014 
The Mennonite owners of a Pennsylvania 
furniture manufacturing company who 
unsuccessfully argued that the new federal 
mandate that they pay for contraceptive 
services violated their First Amendment 
rights asked a Pennsylvania federal court 
Wednesday to block the requirement, 
following the U.S. Supreme Court's Hobby 
Lobby decision.  
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., and its 
owners, the Hahn family, told 
Pennsylvania’s Eastern District that it is 
entitled to an injunction in light of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s June 30 Hobby Lobby 
decision, which found that the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act applies to closely 
held companies and shields them from 
having to provide contraception coverage to 
their employees. 
In an amended motion filed two days prior 
to its brief, the furniture company said that 
its health insurance will not currently take 
any action to omit items that violate its 
religious beliefs. 
“An injunction is needed to protect plaintiffs 
and their health insurance carrier from the 
mandate and its attendant penalties, so that 
the burden on plaintiffs’ religious beliefs can 
be lifted and plaintiffs’ health insurance plan 
can once again omit items that violate 
plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious belief that 
the prescribed items are potentially 
abortifacient including education and 
counseling for the same,” the company said. 
After the district court denied the furniture 
company’s bid for a preliminary injunction 
in January 2013, it appealed to the Third 
Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s 
decision last July. Conestoga then petitioned 
the Supreme Court, which agreed in 
November to take up the cases filed by 
Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. and Conestoga in 
order to resolve a circuit split over the 
Affordable Care Act provision, with the 
Tenth Circuit having ruled in Hobby 
Lobby's favor. 
In a 5-4 vote on June 30, the high court 
created an exemption to the health care law's 
requirement that for-profit companies offer 
birth control coverage to their employees, 
saying that closely held for-profit 
corporations are entitled to religious 
freedom protections. But it refused to 
expand that ruling to other medical practices 
such as blood transfusions or vaccinations. 
The contraception mandate required that 
companies with more than 50 employees to 
provide female employees covered by a 
company health plan with specified 
contraceptive coverage at no cost, or face 
financial penalties. 
Although Solicitor General Donald B. 
Verrilli Jr. claimed during oral arguments in 
March that siding with family-owned Hobby 
Lobby and Conestoga would ultimately 
infringe on their employees' rights, the 
majority opinion noted that the federal 
government had already provided several 
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exemptions to religious organizations and 
nonprofits, and the mandate-at-issue isn't the 
least restrictive means of providing 
contraception coverage to workers. 
Justice Samuel A. Alito, who wrote the 
majority opinion, maintained that the ruling 
wouldn't protect employers who illegally 
discriminate against workers under the guise 
of their religious beliefs. 
Hobby Lobby repeatedly told the Supreme 
Court that corporations frequently engage in 
religious exercise, as the government 
concedes with its exemptions for nonprofit 
religious organizations, and no 
constitutional right — including that of 
religious freedom — turns on the tax status 
of a corporation, a premise the majority of 
the justices ultimately agreed with. 
But Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who wrote 
the principal dissent, blasted the majority 
opinion and noted that closely held 
companies can still be massive organizations 
worth billions of dollars. 
More than 80 amicus briefs were filed in the 
case from a wide range of advocacy, 
medical, legal and religious groups, dozens 
of states, and more than 100 federal 
lawmakers, among others. 
"With the Supreme Court’s recent ruling 
upholding a family business’ religious 
freedom, Conestoga Wood renewed their 
request for an injunction," Kevin Theriot, 
attorney Conestoga, told Law360. "The 
Supreme Court's ruling makes it clear that 
the government cannot coerce Conestoga 
Wood to pay for abortion causing drugs in 
violation of  the religious convictions of the 
Hahn family.” 
Representatives for the U.S. government did 
not immediately return a request for 
comment Wednesday. 
Conestoga Wood Specialties is represented 
by Charles W. Proctor III of Law Offices of 
Proctor Lindsay & Dixon LLC, Randall 
Luke Wenger of Independence Law Center, 
and David A. Cortman, Matthew S. 
Bowman and Kevin Theriot of Alliance 
Defending Freedom. 
The U.S. government is represented by 
Michelle R. Bennett of the U.S. Department 
of Justice, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General Stuart F. Delery, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General Ian Heath 
Gershengorn, U.S. Attorney Zane David 
Memeger, Director Jennifer Ricketts and 
Deputy Director Sheila M. Lieber. 
The case is Conestoga Wood Specialties 
Corp. et al. v. Sylvia M. Burwell et al., case 
number 12-6744, in the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
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“What Hobby Lobby Shows Us About the Supreme Court and Civil Rights 
Laws: Winners and Losers in the Roberts Court” 
Huffington Post 
Elliot Mincberg 
July 24, 2014 
In its recent decision in Hobby Lobby, the 
conservative 5-4 majority -- Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, Thomas, 
and Kennedy -- did something that may 
appear very unusual. In divided cases, these 
five Justices have the reputation for 
interpreting very narrowly laws passed by 
Congress to protect civil rights. So why did 
they interpret so broadly the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), a law 
passed by Congress to protect the important 
civil right of religious freedom? The answer, 
unfortunately, is all too clear. Comparing 
Hobby Lobby with the two rulings in civil 
rights law cases issued by the Court over the 
last year, the key factor that explains how 
the conservative majority ruled is not 
precedent, the language of the statute, or 
congressional intent, but who wins and who 
loses. 
Let's start with last year's rulings, both of 
which concerned Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act which bans employment 
discrimination. In University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the 
majority ruled very narrowly in interpreting 
Title VII, deciding that the only way that 
employees can prevail on a claim that they 
have been fired in retaliation for raising job 
bias claims is to prove that they would not 
have been discharged "but for" the 
retaliatory motive. This was despite the fact 
that in order to strengthen Title VII, 
Congress added language to the law in 1991 
to make clear that plaintiffs should prevail if 
they show that discrimination was a 
"motivating factor" in a job decision. As 
Justice Ginsburg explained in dissecting 
Justice Alito's attempt for the majority to 
draw a distinction between retaliation and 
other claims under Title VII, the net effect 
of the majority's ruling was to make it 
harder to prove a Title VII retaliation claim 
than before the 1991 law and with respect to 
other civil rights statutes that don't explicitly 
mention retaliation. The 5-4 majority had 
"seized on a provision adopted by Congress 
as part of an endeavor to strengthen Title 
VII," she concluded, "and turned it into a 
measure reducing the force of the ban on 
retaliation." 
In Nassar, in ruling against a doctor of 
Middle Eastern descent in a case also 
involving egregious ethnic and national 
origin discrimination, Alito disregarded 
clear legislative history and language 
showing Congress' broad intent, as well as 
the interpretation of the law by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC). Interestingly, towards the end of 
his opinion, Alito appeared to reveal a key 
consideration behind the majority's decision. 
The ruling was important, he explained, to 
"the fair and responsible allocation of 
resources in the judicial and litigation 
systems." After all, he pointed out, 
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retaliation claims "are being made with 
ever-increasing frequency," although he did 
not even consider how many have been 
proven meritorious. Agreeing with the 
EEOC and the plaintiff on the "motivating 
factor" standard, he wrote instead, "could 
also contribute to the filing of frivolous 
claims." As Justice Ginsburg put it, the 
majority "appears driven by zeal to reduce 
the number of retaliation claims against 
employers." 
The other 2013 Title VII ruling also 
reflected an extremely narrow reading of the 
law. Vance v. Ball State University 
concerned a complaint by an African-
American woman that she had been 
subjected to racial harassment and a racially 
hostile work environment. Under prior Title 
VII Court rulings agreed to by both 
conservative and moderate Justices, the 
employer itself is often liable for such 
harassment claims when the harassment is 
committed by an employee's supervisor. But 
in Vance, in an opinion by Justice Alito, the 
familiar 5-4 Court majority significantly 
narrowed Title VII. It ruled that such 
vicarious employer liability applies only 
when the harassment is committed by a 
manager who can fire or reduce the pay or 
grade of the victim, not when it is 
committed by a manager who does not have 
that power but does control the day-to-day 
schedules, assignments, and working 
environment of the victim. 
As Justice Ginsburg explained in dissent, the 
majority's holding again contradicted 
guidance issued by the EEOC as well as 
Congress' broad purpose to eliminate 
workplace discrimination. In fact, she 
pointed out, not even the university 
defendant in Vance itself "has advanced the 
restrictive definition the Court adopts." But 
again, Alito's opinion betrayed part of the 
majority's true motives. Its narrow 
interpretation would be "workable" and 
"readily applied," Alito explained. And it 
would promote "the limitation of employer 
liability in certain circumstances." 
Something very different happened in the 
next Supreme Court case interpreting a 
Congressional civil rights statute: 2014's 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. 
In that case, the same 5-4 majority that 
narrowly interpreted Title VII in Vance and 
Nassar adopted a very broad interpretation 
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA). All nine Justices agreed that RFRA 
was enacted by Congress in response to the 
Supreme Court decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith, which restricted the 
protection of religious liberty by the Court 
under the First Amendment. But the 5-4 
majority in Hobby Lobby ruled that RFRA 
provides "very broad protection for religious 
liberty" - "even broader protection than was 
available" under the First Amendment in 
pre-Smith decisions. As Justice Ginsburg put 
it in dissent, the majority interpreted RFRA 
"as a bold initiative departing from, rather 
than restoring, pre-Smith jurisprudence." 
She explained further that this broad 
interpretation contradicted the language of 
the statute, its legislative history, and a 
statement by the Court in a unanimous 
ruling in 2006 that in RFRA, Congress 
"adopt[ed] a statutory rule comparable to the 
constitutional rule rejected in Smith." 
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This difference in statutory interpretation 
was critical to the majority's ruling in Hobby 
Lobby -- that for-profit corporations whose 
owners had religious objections to 
contraceptives could invoke RFRA to refuse 
to obey the Affordable Care Act's mandate 
that they provide their employees with 
health plans under which contraceptives are 
available to female employees. As Justice 
Ginsburg explained, no previous Court 
decision under RFRA or the First 
Amendment had ever "recognized a for-
profit corporation's qualification for a 
religious exemption" and such a ruling 
"surely is not grounded in the pre-Smith 
precedent Congress sought to preserve." The 
5-4 majority's broad interpretation that 
RFRA applies to for-profit corporations like 
Hobby Lobby was obviously crucial to its 
holding. 
In addition, however, the 5-4 majority went 
beyond pre-Smith case-law in another 
crucial respect. Before a person can claim an 
exemption from a generally applicable law 
under RFRA, he or she must prove that the 
law "substantially burden[s] a person's 
exercise of religion." According to the 
majority, the corporations in Hobby Lobby 
met that standard by demonstrating that the 
use of certain contraceptives that could be 
purchased by their employees under their 
health plans would seriously offend the 
deeply held religious beliefs of their owners. 
As Justice Ginsburg explained, however, 
that ruling conflicted with pre-Smith case 
law on what must be shown to prove a 
"substantial burden." In several pre-Smith 
cases, the Court had ruled that there was no 
"substantial burden" created by, for 
example, the government's use of a social 
security number to administer benefit 
programs or its requirement that social 
security taxes be paid, despite the genuine 
and sincere offense that these actions caused 
to some religious beliefs. As Justice 
Ginsburg stated, such religious "beliefs, 
however deeply held, do not suffice to 
sustain a RFRA claim," except under the 
extremely broad interpretation of RFRA by 
the 5-4 Court majority. 
As in the Title VII cases, Justice Alito's 
opinion for the 5-4 majority in Hobby Lobby 
was revealing about some of the majority's 
underlying concerns. In explaining the 
majority's decision to interpret RFRA as 
applying to for-profit corporations, Justice 
Alito noted that "[w]hen rights, whether 
constitutional or statutory, are extended to 
corporations, the purpose is to protect the 
rights of these people" - in this case "the 
humans who own and control those 
companies" in the Hobby Lobby case. As 
Justice Ginsburg observed, the 5-4 majority 
paid little attention to the Court's 
pronouncement in a pre-Smith case that 
permitting a religious exemption to a general 
law for a corporation would "operate[e] to 
impose the employer's religious faith on the 
employees" of the corporation.   Even 
though the Supreme Court's 2013-14 rulings 
that interpreted civil rights laws passed by 
Congress may seem different, a common 
theme animates them all. Whether the 5-4 
majority interpreted the statutes broadly or 
narrowly, the losers in all of them were 
women, minorities, and working people, and 
the winners were employers and 
corporations. In the majority's own words, 
the result is the "limitation of employer 
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liability" under laws like Title VII designed 
to protect workers and the "protecting" of 
the "humans who own and control" 
corporations under RFRA. 
Since all these rulings interpret 
Congressional statutes, not the Constitution, 
Congress clearly has the authority to reverse 
them. In fact, Congress has done exactly that 
with respect to other 5-4 rulings by the 
Court that misinterpreted civil rights statutes 
to harm women and minority workers and 
benefit their corporate employers. As 
recently as 2009, the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act reversed a flawed 5-4 ruling that 
severely restricted workers' ability to file 
equal pay claims under Title VII. Congress 
is already considering legislation to reverse 
many of the effects of Hobby Lobby, a 
corrective effort that Senate Republicans 
have blocked by a filibuster to prevent the 
full Senate from even considering it. In our 
currently divided Congress, immediate 
prospects for the passage of such remedial 
legislation may not appear promising. But it 
is important to recognize the current 5-4 
majority's pattern of favoring corporations 
and harming workers in its decisions 
interpreting federal civil rights laws, and to 
recognize and act on the ability to reverse 
these harmful rulings. 
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“Satanists Troll Hobby Lobby” 
The Atlantic 
Emma Green 
July 30, 2014 
Sometimes American religious liberty gets 
weird. An Amish person can be sent to 
prison for shearing the beard of another 
Amish person. A gentile can discover a love 
for kosher food in prison. And the same 
laws that protect the religious freedom of 
evangelical Christians also apply to devoted 
Satanists. 
This week, the Satanists made moves to 
claim their share of liberty. The Satanic 
Temple, a putatively diabolical 
denomination, announced it's seeking a 
religious exemption for people who live in 
states with "informed consent" laws that 
require doctors to share certain information 
with women before they get an abortion. 
This sometimes includes materials about 
"the link between abortion and breast 
cancer, as well as claims regarding a 
depressive 'post-abortion syndrome,'" the 
Satanic Temple claims, which they see as 
"'scientifically unfounded' and 'medically 
invalid' and therefore an affront to their 
religious beliefs."  
Objections to informed-consent laws are not 
new, but the Satanists' tactic is. They're 
invoking the Supreme Court's ruling 
in Hobby Lobby, which said that "closely 
held" businesses with religious objections to 
contraceptives cannot be required to cover 
them in the insurance they provide to their 
employees, as required by the Affordable 
Care Act. The plaintiffs claimed the 
mandate violated their religious beliefs, and 
the Court agreed, saying in a 5-4 ruling that 
the government had not devised the "least 
restrictive means" of making contraceptives 
affordable and accessible to women. 
The Satanic Temple is inverting the context 
of that ruling: It believes in a woman's right 
to get an abortion without having to listen to 
information its members see as non-
scientific. This is rooted in the group's belief 
in a "scientific understanding of the world," 
according to the press release. 
As a thought experiment, this is fascinating, 
because it tests the boundaries of the Hobby 
Lobby ruling, asking: How will the Court's 
decision change the nature of religious-
liberty claims in the United States? This is 
not the first time this question has come 
up. The ruling has already encouraged 
religious groups to petition the White House 
for special consideration on matters like 
non-discrimination against gay employees. 
Here, though, the Satanists are pushing the 
question further. As a serious proposition, 
there are two big problems with the Satanic 
Temple's case. The organization's legal 
claims don't really hold up, and, as it turns 
out, it's not Satanic. 
First, the organization isn't actually seeking 
an exemption through legal means, like a 
lawsuit or a legislative change. Instead, it 
has "drawn up a letter for women who are 
considering an abortion. The letter explains 
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our position and puts the care provider on 
notice that a failure to respect our call for an 
exemption from state—mandated informed 
consent materials constitutes a violation of 
our religious liberty." 
But that letter is legally meaningless, 
explained Ira Lupu, a law professor at 
George Washington University. "These laws 
create obligations for doctors to inform, not 
obligations for women to listen or read," he 
wrote in an email.  
The Satanic Temple's spokesman, Lucien 
Greaves, said in an email that the letter is a 
first step. "We are not looking to initiate a 
proactive lawsuit in revolt against anti-
abortion laws. We are prepared, however, to 
go to court to defend our deeply held beliefs 
if and when our religious liberties, as 
outlined in our exemption letter, are not 
respected." 
But the problem is not just that the letter is 
meaningless; it's unclear that informed-
consent laws actually create a religious 
burden on anyone, Satanist or not. The main 
question in Hobby Lobby was whether the 
law was a burden on religious practice, said 
Eduardo Peñalver, the dean of the Cornell 
University Law School. "The typical form a 
burden is saying, 'I’m being coerced to do 
something that my religious forbids me to 
do, or coerced not to do something that my 
religion requires me to do,'" he explained. 
"I’m not sure how these informed-consent 
laws would be framed in those terms—my 
religion forbids me from hearing these 
informed-consent disclosures?" 
The other problem is that the Satanic 
Temple wants to extend this exemption to 
"all women who share our deeply held 
belief." Peñalver said this undermines the 
organization's claim. "If these are people 
who are not members of the Satanist Temple 
or adherents to Satanism, their basis for 
objecting may not be religious," he said. "If 
you’re going to raise a religious claim, you 
have to have a religious point of view."  
And this is where things get a little tricky for 
the Satanic Temple. As Gideon Resnick 
wrote in The Atlantic in February, "Lucien 
Greaves" is actually a pseudonym used by a 
man named Douglas Mesner. He isn't 
actually much into Satan worship. “I think 
that idea is silly,” he told Resnick. “I can’t 
even conceive of that actually being the 
case.” He added, “I mean, I try to respect 
other people’s beliefs as far as that kind of 
thing goes.” 
According to Resnick, the Satanic Temple 
only has about 20 active members; people 
can join through an email listserv. Although 
the size of the group doesn't directly affect 
the strength of its religious-liberty claims, 
their goals and actions do provide evidence 
about how sincere they are. "To say your 
religion is completely separated from your 
politics is asinine," Mesner told Resnick in 
February. "Our political actions are our 
religion." 
In short, if the Satanic Temple took this to 
court, it would probably have a hard time 
showing that informed-consent laws are a 
violation of its sincerely held religious 
beliefs, rather than a group of people's 
political views. 
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But as much as anything, the Satanic 
Temple is trying to make a point: The 
Supreme Court has accepted the earnestness 
of one group's politically controversial 
religious views, leaving an open question 
about what qualifies as a sincerely held 
religious belief. The ruling in Hobby 
Lobby was made "in the context of a 
familiar religious tradition, rather than one 
outside of the mainstream," Peñalver said. 
"We’re a religiously diverse country." 
This case "seems self-consciously political 
and theatrical," said Peñalver. But "in terms 
of the kinds of religious claims we might see 
in the future, that’s a very difficult question 
to answer." 
Juxtaposing the religious beliefs of alleged 
Satanists and evangelical Christians may 
seem farcical, but it's revealing: It's not 
enough to claim that a law you disagree with 
violates your conscience; there are still 
complicated legal tests for those claims. As 
Lupu said, "This is politically serious and 
legally a bit silly." 
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“Rules for Birth-Control Mandate after Hobby Lobby” 
SCOTUS Blog 
Lyle Denniston 
August 22, 2014 
The Obama administration, planning to 
change its health insurance rules to satisfy 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in June limiting 
the federal birth-control mandate, proposed 
on Friday that for-profit companies with 
publicly traded stock will not qualify for a 
new exemption… 
The new rules appear to have two 
purposes:  to keep the mandate under the 
Affordable Care Act within the new limits 
required by the Court’s decision in Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, but also to make 
sure that women who work for employers 
who object to the mandate for religious 
reasons would continue to have access to 
that coverage.  The revisions would apply to 
both for-profit businesses and non-profit 
groups like religiously oriented charities, 
hospitals, schools, and colleges. 
In its June 30 decision, the Court by a five-
to-four vote gave businesses formed as 
“closely held corporations” a new 
exemption from the requirement that most 
businesses must provide a variety of 
pregnancy-preventive health care coverage 
for their female workers, if the firm’s 
owners have religious objections to those 
services. 
Before that ruling, government rules did not 
allow for-profit firms any exemption from 
that mandate, and it limited the exemption 
that did exist for non-profit groups of a 
religious nature.  The Hobby Lobby decision 
required a new exemption for some for-
profit firms based on a federal law that 
protects religious freedom, and a separate 
action the Court took after that ruling – in a 
case involving Wheaton College in Illinois – 
ordered the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) to ease the 
mandate for that college (and, by 
implication, for some other non-profit 
groups). 
In Friday’s action, HHS issued a new set of 
birth-control rules in interim form and 
sought comments from the public to help 
shape the final rules.  The proposed rule for 
profit-making businesses is not yet in effect, 
but the change for non-profit religious 
groups is to take effect almost immediately. 
Here, in summary, is what HHS is proposing 
for for-profit businesses whose owners 
object to the mandate: 
* An exemption from the mandate would 
only exist for a for-profit business organized 
as a “closely-held corporation.” 
* Two alternative definitions for such a 
corporation were offered for comment, but 
in both, the corporation would not be 
eligible for an exemption based on its 
religious objections if it had stock that is 
publicly traded. 
* One way to define such a corporation 
would be by specifying a maximum number 
of owners that it could have – with the 
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public urged to help spell that out.  The 
alternative way would be by specifying a 
minimum percentage of a total number of 
owners who had actual ownership 
concentrated among them – with the public 
again asked help to spell that out. 
* HHS is not committed to either of those 
approaches, and asked for suggestions for 
alternatives. 
* The public was invited to make 
suggestions on how a for-profit firm could 
be required to prove that its owners have 
established that they do have religious 
objections to the mandate. 
* If a corporation’s governing structure 
takes action, in keeping with state law 
governing corporations, to claim a religious 
exemption, and then lets the government 
know of its objection (by official form or by 
a simple letter), that would be enough to put 
the government on notice of the objection, 
and it would then lead the government to 
take steps to take over providing access to 
the services independently of the owners and 
at no cost to them or to the workers. 
* The public was given sixty dates to submit 
comments on the proposal, which is not yet 
in effect. 
Here, in summary, is what HHS is proposing 
for non-profit groups of a religious nature 
that object to the mandate: 
* Instead of having to formally notify the 
organization’s health plan administrator of 
the religious objection, the organization 
need only write to HHS to claim the 
exemption.  That would trigger HHS to take 
over to provide contraceptive services, 
independently of the organization and at no 
cost to the organization or its workers. 
* The public was invited to make comments 
on the non-profit proposal, but HHS said 
that this change would go into effect as soon 
as it is formally published — in the next 
issue of the government’s Federal 
Register.  The expanded exemption 
opportunity for non-profits followed 
precisely the approach that the Supreme 
Court had ordered in the Wheaton College 
case on July 3. 
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“Court Rules Against Notre Dame in Contraception Case” 
Wall Street Journal 
Louise Radnofsky & Brent Kendall 
February 21, 2014 
A federal appeals court Friday ruled against 
the University of Notre Dame in a legal 
proceeding claiming the Obama 
administration's contraception-coverage 
requirement is forcing it to violate its 
religious beliefs. 
The 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Chicago in a 2-1 ruling agreed with a lower 
court that had turned away the school's 
request for a temporary injunction sparing it 
from the federal health law's contraception 
requirement. 
The university has argued the Affordable 
Care Act's compromise arrangement 
allowing religiously-affiliated nonprofits to 
let insurance companies handle the 
provision of birth control is inadequate, 
because it still forces the university to be 
complicit in something it believes to be 
immoral. 
Judge Richard Posner, who wrote the 
majority opinion, was dismissive of the 
claim. 
"If the government is entitled to require that 
female contraceptives be provided to women 
free of charge, we have trouble 
understanding how signing the form that 
declares Notre Dame's authorized refusal to 
pay for contraceptives for its students or 
staff, and mailing the authorization 
document to those [insurance] companies, 
which under federal law are obligated to 
pick up the tab, could be thought to 'trigger' 
the provision of female contraceptives," he 
wrote. 
He also criticized the school's officials for 
the timing of the legal action, which he 
described as "awkward" because it came so 
close to the date on which their new 
insurance plan started. 
"We are left with the question, what does 
Notre Dame want us to do?" Judge Posner 
asked. 
In an arrangement to defuse a standoff with 
the Catholic Church over the Affordable 
Care Act, the Obama administration said 
religiously affiliated institutions—such as 
Notre Dame—could turn over responsibility 
for providing contraception coverage to 
insurers, which would inform employees 
they were eligible for the coverage with no 
additional premium or copayments. Dozens 
of these institutions said that compromise 
didn't go far enough and filed suit to exempt 
themselves from the requirement entirely. 
After the university failed to win the 
injunction, it instructed its insurance plan 
administrator to inform school employees 
they are eligible for the separate 
contraception arrangement while the case 
continues. 
The injunction ruling isn't the final word on 
Notre Dame's case. It only determines that 
the school to date hasn't made a strong 
enough showing to block the requirement 
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while a full legal challenge continues in 
court. 
A university spokesman said the school was 
still reviewing the ruling but it continued to 
believe "if we are compelled to be entangled 
in one issue that violates our conscience we 
could be entangled in others as well." 
The case is one of several dozen lawsuits 
challenging the contraception requirement 
for religiously affiliated universities and 
charities. The Supreme Court next month is 
expected to hear a related case brought by 
two religious owners of for-profit 
businesses. 
The business owners are arguing they should 
be allowed to run their companies without 
going against their religious beliefs by 
including the morning-after pill in their 
insurance plans. 
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“Did Little Sisters of the Poor Win or Lose at the Supreme Court?” 
Slate 
Emily Bazelon 
January 24, 2014 
The Supreme Court said late Friday that the 
Little Sisters of the Poor don’t have to fill 
out the Obamacare form for nonprofit 
religious groups seeking an accommodation 
to the contraception mandate. Instead, in 
order to get the exception, Little Sisters, 
which provides housing to elderly people in 
need, essentially has to provide the same 
information to the Department of Health of 
Human Services in a … form (or maybe it’s 
a letter?) the court devised itself. Got that? I 
know, it sounds weird, but that’s pretty 
much the upshot of the court’s three-
sentence order, which will remain in effect 
until the 10
th
 Circuit Court of Appeals rules 
in the case. And which “should not be 
construed as an expression of the Court’s 
views on the merits,” the order states. 
If this is an odd compromise, well, it’s also a 
tricky case. Liberal commentators have said 
otherwise: There’s no serious problem of 
religious freedom here, the New York Times 
editorial page and Slate’s Amanda 
Marcotte argue, because all Obamacare asks 
religious organizations to do is sign a form 
certifying that they don’t provide 
contraception—as they’ve already made 
clear. These cases are about a single two-
page form. But there is no clear answer to 
what signing that form means—or even, 
rather bizarrely, what concrete effect doing 
so has. 
There are about 20 lawsuits bubbling up 
over this around the country, with religious 
groups saying the form is the gateway to 
authorizing contraception coverage, one 
they don’t want to walk through. The 
government responds that actually, for some 
of the groups, signing the form will mean 
nothing at all. Not signing, though, subjects 
them all to hefty fines. The lower courts are 
split over these cases, and so far most of 
them have actually sided with the religious 
groups rather than the government. And so, 
understandably, first Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor on her own and now the full 
court have hit the pause button at this 
preliminary stage, when what’s at issue isn’t 
who wins but whether to delay the fines 
while the courts wrestle with the underlying 
questions. These cases involve the kind of 
tangled facts that take time to sort out. In the 
meantime, it doesn’t make sense to impose 
big fines on groups like Little Sisters. 
The Affordable Care Act requires health 
insurers to cover comprehensive health care 
for women, including a full menu of 
contraception and sterilization services. The 
Department of Health and Human Services 
decided what to cover based on 
recommendations by the Institute of 
Medicine. The IOM brought together a 
bunch of experts, who reached the obvious 
conclusion: Yes, contraception is crucial to 
basic health care for women. After all, 
nearly half of pregnancies are unintended, 
and those pregnancies can have adverse 
health consequences. 
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All good so far. The problem is that most of 
us get health insurance through our 
employers, and some of them object to birth 
control on religious grounds. The Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, passed by 
Congress to safeguard the free exercise of 
religion in 1993, clearly applies to nonprofit 
religious organizations. (Whether it also 
applies to for-profit secular companies is 
a separate question that the Supreme Court 
will address later this term, in the Hobby 
Lobby case and another one involving a 
Mennonite cabinetmaker.) When the United 
States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 
among others, kicked up a fuss about the 
contraception mandate back in 2011, the 
Obama administration created two different 
exemptions. The first is for houses of 
worship (churches, mosques, and 
synagogues). It’s a total exemption—these 
employers don’t have to do anything to get it 
and their employees have to pay for their 
own contraception. The second kind is for 
religious nonprofit organizations, and this 
one is more like a partial accommodation. 
These groups, which include Little Sisters of 
the Poor, the University of Notre Dame, and 
hundreds of others, have to sign the two-
page form and send it to the “third-party 
administrator” of their health insurance 
plans. Those entities (TPAs for short) then 
are bound to provide contraception to the 
religious group’s employees, according to 
the Obamacare regulations, without billing 
or in any way involving the employer. The 
government is supposed to pay instead, by 
lowering the fees the TPA pays in the 
federal health exchange. 
The government, the objecting religious 
groups, and various judges characterize this 
accommodation in diametrically opposed 
ways. Here is Chief Judge Philip Simon of 
the Northern District of Indiana (a George 
W. Bush appointee) rejecting a suit by the 
University of Notre Dame: 
Notre Dame wants to eat its cake, 
and have it still, at the expense of 
Congress, administrative agencies, 
and the employees who will be 
affected. Notre Dame is free to opt 
out of providing the coverage itself, 
but it can’t stop anyone else from 
providing it. But that is essentially 
what Notre Dame is requesting. 
And here is Judge Brian Cogan of the 
Eastern District of New York (another 
George W. Bush appointee), agreeing with a 
bunch of Catholic schools and hospitals that 
compelling them to sign the form, or face 
heavy fines, violates their religious freedom: 
The non-exempt plaintiffs are 
required to complete and submit the 
self-certification, which authorizes a 
third-party to provide the 
contraceptive coverage to which they 
object. They consider this to be an 
endorsement of such coverage; to 
them, the self-certification 
“compel[s] affirmation of a 
repugnant belief. 
Honestly, isn’t this like a picture you can 
look at and see two entirely different things? 
One view is that asking Little Sisters of the 
Poor to sign this form is like asking a 
Quaker to state his or her opposition to 
fighting a war in order to be considered a 
conscientious objector. You can’t argue that 
saying you refuse to fight itself burdens your 
freedom of religious expression because it 
means someone else will go to war. But 
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maybe that’s the wrong way to look at it. 
The alternate view is that demanding Little 
Sisters of the Poor sign this form to avoid a 
big fine compels the group to ask someone 
else to sin on its behalf. If you see this as the 
group opening the door to getting their 
employees birth control, which they have a 
genuine religious objection to doing, then 
maybe it’s not fair to ask them to do that. 
I don’t know about you, but I can see it both 
ways. Important note: Even if you choose 
the second view and think this Obamacare 
regulation does burden the exercise of 
religious freedom, you haven’t decided the 
case yet. The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act says you must then decide whether there 
is a compelling reason for the government to 
impose the burden in the first place. On this 
one, to me the answer is a clear yes, because 
of the tangible and significant health 
benefits for women that come with covering 
contraception. 
But the strange thing about the case brought 
by Little Sisters of the Poor is that the 
government now says that if the group signs 
the form, its employees will be zero steps 
closer to getting their birth control covered. 
Huh? I know, it sounds crazy, because what 
exactly is this case about if that’s true? But 
it is. The government has realized that Little 
Sisters provides health care through “church 
plans” that are governed by another federal 
law, ERISA. And under ERISA, church 
plans cannot be obligated to cover 
contraception. That goes for their third-party 
administrators, too. So if Little Sisters of the 
Poor were to sign this form, its TPA, 
Christian Brothers Services, wouldn’t have 
to arrange for a single IUD or birth control 
prescription. On the law 
blog Balkanization, Marty Lederman calls 
this a “lacuna” that the government 
“presumably did not anticipate.” 
You can argue, as the government has tried 
to before the Supreme Court, that this means 
there is no religious burden at stake for 
Little Sisters. No birth control, no lawsuit. 
But I would also like to know what the point 
is of making the group sign this Obamacare 
form? Why push them to authorize 
contraceptive care, even theoretically, if the 
whole thing is an empty exercise? How can 
the government show it has a compelling 
interest in making nothing happen? Or as 
Daniel Blomberg, a lawyer for the Becket 
Fund for Religious Liberty, which represents 
Little Sisters, put it to me over the phone, 
“When does the government force you to 
either engage in meaningless speech or pay 
millions of dollars?” Blomberg also argues 
that Little Sisters can’t know for sure it’s in 
the clear, because the government hasn’t 
entirely given up on enforcing the 
contraception mandate in this case. Its 
lawyers told one judge that the Obama 
administration "continues to consider 
potential options to fully and appropriately 
extend the consumer protections provided 
by the regulations to self-insured church 
plans."  
Also, some of the religious groups that are 
suing don’t offer ERISA-based church 
plans, so they don’t fall into the gap between 
these two different sets of regulations. Notre 
Dame, for example, has decided to go ahead 
and sign the Obamacare form, knowing that 
its employees will actually get contraception 
coverage, while the lawsuit it has brought 
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continues to play out. This case, and others 
by religious groups who are clearly subject 
to the contraception mandate, are the more 
interesting ones, which will eventually 
determine the outcome of this clash between 
religious freedom (arguably) and women’s 
health. Now that the Supreme Court has 
issued its Friday order, the action moves 
back to the lower courts. Godspeed to them. 
